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Infections frequently occur on both networks of devices and networks
of people, and can model not only viruses, but also information, rumors, and
product use. However, in many circumstances, the infection process itself is
hidden, and only the effects, e.g. sickness or knowledge, can be observed. In
addition, this information is likely incomplete, missing many sick nodes, as
well as inaccurate, with false positives. To use this data effectively, it is often
essential to identify the infection process causing the sickness, or even whether
the cause is an infection. For our purposes, we consider the susceptible-infected
(SI) infection model. We seek to distinguish between infections and random
sickness, as well as between different infection (or infection-like) processes in
a limited information setting.
We formulate this as a hypothesis testing problem, where (typically)
in the null, the sickness affects nodes at random, and in the alternative, the
vii
infection is spread through the network. Similarly, we consider the case where
the sickness may be caused by one of two infection (or infection-like) processes,
and we wish to find which is the causative process.
We do this is a setting with very limited information, given only a single
snapshot of the infection. Only a small portion of the infected population re-
ports the sickness. In addition, there are several other limitations we consider.
There may be false positives, obfuscating the infection. Similarly, there may be
a random sickness and epidemic process occurring simultaneously. Knowledge
of the graph topology may be incomplete, with unknown edges over which the
infection may spread. The graph may also be weighted, affecting the way the
infection spreads over the graph. In all these cases, we develop algorithms to
identify the causative process of the infection utilizing the fact that infected
nodes will be clustered. We demonstrate that under reasonable conditions,
these algorithms detect an infection with asymptotically zero error probability
as the graph size increases.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Research into social networks garnered increased interest in recent years.
These networks can represent relationships between people, devices, and com-
panies. In an age where online networking services such as Twitter and Face-
book play an increasingly ubiquitous role is peoples’ lives, understanding social
networks is now more vital than ever before. These services both make social
networks more important, but also makes analyzing them more feasible and
useful. There is a massive amount of information available about the inter-
actions between people, as well as about the individuals themselves, that can
analyzed to provide superior service, better targeting of ads, and many other
applications. Though the number of ways to approach and analyze this data
is practically unlimited, this thesis focuses mainly on developing our under-
standing of infections over such graphs.
An infection on a network is a simple representation of a process where
some state spreads from one person/entity to another. This is clearest in a
standard infection: a biological or computer virus. A virus spreads from an
infected person or device to another person/device they are connected to. For
people, this would be from one person to another person they spend significant
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amount of time with. That is, it spreads between people in close social contact.
Likewise, for computers and other devices, viruses can spread through physical
networks, but also through social networks. For example, many computer virus
exploit the trust people have in email that appears to be from acquaintances
to infect additional people. These infections can be modeled as nodes (people
or devices) spreading an infection over a network. This network may be real
life social contacts, Internet social networks, physical networks, etc. We use
the SI infection model, where the infection spreads at a constant rate across
the edges of a graph, and once a node becomes infected, it never recovers.
There are two classes of approaches to understanding infections, which
can be termed the forward and backward problems. In the forward problem,
the goal is to understand how the infection spreads over the social network.
Topics in this area include understanding the speed and size of infections
and determining how the shape of the network impacts the infection’s spread.
Considerable effort has been devoted to such problems. On the other hand,
the backward problem involves trying to infer properties of the infection when
given the resulting infection. Relative to the previous class of problem, work
on this topic is lacking. This is despite of the number of potential applications
for this approach, especially with the amount of data readily available on many
social networks.
In many cases, the key question is, is there an infection occurring and
what is its causative network? Prior work on topic has focused on a high
information regime, where one has knowledge of the entire infection process,
2
and possibly even of multiple infections. The focus of thesis is on the low and
unreliable information regime. Information on the infection is sparse, and even
unreliable, characteristics of many practical data sets. Under these conditions,
the goal is to distinguish between two candidate hypothesis for the infection
process. These infection processes may be random sicknesses, or spread from
node to node on a graph. We refer to the latter case an an epidemic.
There are many applications to this problem. In the case of an illness
in a population, the ability to distinguish between a mostly random sickness
(such as the common cold) and a very infectious illness (such as the flu) can
be invaluable. Early detection of such infections could lead to faster and more
efficient resources deployment, earlier warnings for the population and similar
benefits. This is likewise true for device malfunctions. They may be due to
part defects, or be caused by malware spreading over the network. Again,
distinguishing between these two cases would be helpful in diagnosing and
thereafter solving the problem.
A similar application can be found in the case of advertising. For
instance, suppose there is a Facebook ad promoting some product. If the
advertisement is effective, product usage will spread over the Facebook social
network. In this case, we want to know if the the advertisement led to a
significant increase in the popularity of that product. Identifying an epidemic
on that network as a significant contributor to increased product use in this
case would mean that the advertisement was effective.
3
1.1 Main Contributions
We develop algorithms to determine the causative infection process
between two alternative possibilities. We do this for several low information
regimes, as well as different types of infection processes. Our approach relies
on utilizing the clustering of the sick nodes on the infection graph. When
the sick nodes are clustered on a graph, the nodes are likely the result of an
epidemic on that graph.
We evaluate our algorithm performance by the asymptotic error proba-
bility. In particular, we are interested in the range of infection sizes for which
the error probability tends to 0 as the graph size increases. Note that once
the entire graph is infected, it is impossible to distinguish between different
infection processes since there is no topological information. Likewise, when
the infection contains only a small number of sick nodes, it is likely no node
reports an infection, and again solving the problem is impossible. For each
of our algorithms, we demonstrate sufficient conditions on the infection size
(and other problem parameters) so that the error probability vanishes asymp-
totically. Our conditions are generally lenient, and in some cases, they are
order-wise optimal in the infection sizes for which they succeed. These are
supported by simulations. The simulations also provide intuition on the be-
havior of the error probability as the algorithm parameters vary.
The fundamental problem we consider first is where the infection is
either due to a random sickness (nodes are sick independently with identical
probability), or an epidemic (the infection spreads from node to nodes across
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the graph). We develop two algorithms to distinguish between these infections
processes. In the first, we evaluate the likelihood that the sick nodes are from
an epidemic by the size of the smallest ball containing the nodes. In the
second, we rate the probability of an epidemic by the size of the smallest tree
containing all the sick nodes. We evaluate these on three standard graphs:
grids, trees, and Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs. We find that in most cases, the ball
based algorithm is superior or equal to the tree algorithm.
The next case we consider is when the infection spreads on one of
two different graphs. We require these graphs to satisfy basic topological
constraints satisfied by many standard graphs. By comparing the relative
clustering on each graph using the minimum containing ball’s size as before,
we demonstrate it is possible to determine the correct infection graph with
high probability.
We extend our algorithm to be more robust by eliminating outliers. We
apply this algorithm to the case when there are false positives, both random
and adversarial. Another variation we consider is distinguishing between two
mixed infection processes, where a random sickness and epidemic processes
occur simultaneously. However, in one process, the epidemic is the dominate
process. A similar robust algorithm is shown to succeed in this case as well.
In addition, we examine when some edges on the graph are not known, which
we show can also be solved by our algorithm.
The final case we consider is weighted graphs. In these graphs, the
infection may spread at different rates between different pairs of nodes. We
5
develop a modified algorithm that uses the size of the largest ball that con-
tains a minimum density of sick nodes. This algorithm is shown to achieve
asymptotically zero error probability and in simulations, may perform better
than previous algorithms.
1.2 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, we consider the fundamental problem of distinguishing
a random sickness from an epidemic. In Chapter 3, there are two different
epidemics that must be distinguished. In Chapter 4, we analyze the case
when there are false positives. The problem we consider in Chapter 5 is when
the infection processes are a mixture of random sicknesses and epidemics. In
Chapter 6, we examine the case when some edges of the infection graph are
unknown. Finally, we analyze infections on weighted graphs in Chapter 7.
Our conclusion and opportunities for future work are presented in Chapter 8.
6
Chapter 2
Fundamental Problem
2.1 Introduction
It is vital to understand and identify the spread of infections through
networks, social and physical, in order to respond appropriately, whether
through quarantines, predicting future spreads, planning for future actions,
etc. In these circumstances, the key challenge is to understand the process by
which the infection is spreading with limited information available.
The situation we consider is when the infection is observed at a par-
ticular time. Other time related information, particularly the time when each
sick becomes infected, is not available. Likewise, it is not known which node
infects which other nodes. Without the time history of the infection, it is im-
possible to directly determine how the infection spread, including determining
the underlying network. However, the set of sick nodes can be used to evaluate
whether a provided hypothesis for the infection process is likely.
We suppose that there are two candidates for the process by which the
The work in this chapter appears in the following publication:
Chris Milling, Constantine Caramanis, Shie Mannor, and Sanjay Shakkottai. Network
forensics: random infection vs spreading epidemic. SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev.,
40(1):223–234, June 2012.
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infection is spreading, one of which represents the true infection process. The
infection is either the result of a random sickness, or an epidemic. The param-
eters of these hypotheses are fully specified to the algorithm. In particular, the
full infection network is known. The collection of sick nodes is used to evaluate
both processes to determine which is the most likely cause of the infection.
In an epidemic, the sickness travels along the edges of the network
from a source and results in a clustered infection. On the other hand, in a
random sickness, each node is sick randomly and independently with some
probability. Then there is no structural relationship between sick nodes in a
random sickness. Exploiting this characteristic helps us determine whether or
not a collection of sick nodes represents an epidemic. For example, there may
be many people with flu-like symptoms being treated in some area. We would
like to determine whether this represents an actual outbreak of the flu, or just
an occurrence of several colds, using the topological information in the set of
sick people.
If the full set of infected nodes were known, this problem would be
relatively simple to solve in most circumstances. Simply testing the connec-
tivity of the nodes would be sufficient. However, real data is almost never so
complete. Thus, we assume the knowledge of the sick nodes is only partial.
This information may be available from self-reports of the infection, which will
necessarily not include all the nodes. For example, only a portion of people in-
fected with an illness may go to the doctor, or only a portion of those infected
may be correctly identified. Alternatively, if the data is from a survey, it is
8
impossible to reach every person. The fact that the knowledge of the infected
nodes is incomplete must be considered to accurately discover the spreading
mechanism of viruses. This limitation can be modeled by having each node
decide randomly whether to report the infection.
We phrase this as a hypothesis testing problem. Our null hypothesis
is that the infection is caused by a random sickness. On the other hand,
the alternative hypothesis is that the infection resulted from an epidemic. In
a Type I error, a random sickness is mistaken as an infection, because for
example, the randomly sick nodes were grouped like an infection. A Type II
error is when an infection is incorrectly diagnosed as a random sickness, often
because the infection has grown too large. Figure 2.1 provides examples of
when a Type I and a Type II error might occur.
In this chapter we consider only this most basic formulation. The algo-
rithms we develop represent a fundamental and simple solution to the problem
of identifying the correct infection process. Later chapters cover extensions of
this problem in additional limitations on the information available, and for
other infection models. These will build on the approach developed here.
2.1.1 Contributions
We develop several algorithms to solve these problems. These algo-
rithms use the clustering of the sick nodes to estimate the most likely causative
process from the two hypotheses. We term these algorithms the Threshold Ball
Algorithm and the Threshold Tree Algorithm. These algorithms use the small-
9
Figure 2.1: Grid graphs with infected nodes red. The left-hand graph shows
a possible Type I error, with randomly sick nodes unfortunately clustered. If
there are very few reporting sick nodes, such errors are impossible to rule out,
hence our results impose an assumption that at least log n nodes report. The
right-hand graph shows a possible Type II error, where the infection has spread
out considerably, and the many false negatives make the infection appear like
a random sickness. If the infection has spread too far, such errors are again
difficult to rule out, hence our results provide guarantees in the presence of
upper bounds on the number of infected nodes.
est ball and smallest tree, respectively, that contain all the reporting sick nodes
as the key measurement to evaluate whether the sickness is random, or due
to an epidemic. These algorithms compare that measurement to a calculated
threshold to determine whether the sick nodes are clustered like an epidemic.
We prove that for a reasonable range of infection sizes, these algorithms have
a probability of error that tends to 0 as the infection size increases.
2.1.2 Related Work
Most of the work on the susceptible-infected (SI) infection model has
focused on understanding the spread and speed of infection, the analytic side
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of infections. These infections have been analyzed has been for a variety of
settings, such as for graph with both local and global spreading [4], and even
where infected nodes are mobile [24]. Though our problem is not on this
analytic side, we leverage many such results in our proof.
A majority of the work on the inference side of infections is on esti-
mating various parameters of the infection. Demiris and O’Neill estimate the
infection rate using time data for the complete set of infected nodes [15, 16].
One method to doing this is to use a Bayesian inference approach [15]. Another
interesting approach is to use Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods
to estimate the infection rate [16, 58].
A related idea is inferring the source of the infection. Shah and Zaman
develop an algorithm to determine the most likely source of an infection given
the complete set of infected nodes [56]. The method can be efficiently cast as
a belief-propagation algorithm to find the maximum-likelihood estimator for
tree. It can be applied to general graphs by approximating them by breadth
first search (BFS) trees to estimate the infection source. They show through
simulations that the estimated infection source is often close to the true in-
fection source for several types of graphs. Following this work, there have
been extensive studies on this problem of determining an infection’s source in
various contexts [55, 37, 38, 17, 32, 36, 63].
Netrapalli and Sanghavi consider the related problem of estimating
the graph structure using the infection information [51]. In this instance, no
knowledge regarding the network structure is provided. However, they use
11
the full set of infected nodes, as well as the time information regarding when
each node is infected. Multiple infections are performed on this same graph,
which allows their algorithm to detect patterns in infection times, and thereby
infer a graph structure similar to the true network. They develop both a
maximum-likelihood and greedy algorithm, and establish probability of error
upper bounds based on the number of samples.
A similar problem is also considered by Gomez-Rodriguez [22] with
random incubation times (the time from when a node becomes infected until
it can infect its neighbors). They develop an algorithm that approximates the
maximum-likelihood graph and bound the log-likelihood distance from the
optimum graph. The ability to determine the full graph structure is similar to
determining the true infection process considered here, except that candidate
processes are not required. However, this approach requires extreme amounts
of information that is not fully available in many contexts. First, the full
infection set with time stamp information is required, as opposed to only
a partial infection set with no time information. Second and perhaps more
problematic, this data must be obtained over many infections. Then though
their solution may be considered more powerful, their data requirements make
it impossible to use in the minimal information regime.
An alternative interpretation of our problem is that we seek to deter-
mine if any of the likely ‘infection shapes’ (from the set of infected nodes) ex-
plain the known sick nodes. From this perspective, our work is closely related
to the problem in [1], [2]. In that work, the authors consider a hypothesis
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testing problem where every node reports an i.i.d standard normal random
variable, except (in the alternative hypothesis) for a cluster of nodes reporting
a normal with positive mean, from a class of possible clusters.
2.2 Model and Algorithms
In this section, we formally specify the problem details. The models
described here form the foundation of the rest of this thesis.
2.2.1 Infection Model
We consider an infection spreading on a graph G = (V,E), where n =
|V |, the number of nodes. The infection spread according to the standard
susceptible-infected (SI) infection model [20]. Initially, at time 0, a random
node on the graph is selected to be infected. This node is the infection source.
For each edge connected from the infected node to a susceptible node, a clock
is started that expires after duration which is independent and exponentially
distributed with rate 1. After the clock for an edge expires, the adjacent
susceptible node (if it has not been infected already along a different edge)
becomes infected. Then, new clocks are started for each edge between this
node and adjacent susceptible nodes in the same way as before. In this way,
the infection spreads at rate 1 through the network until time t has passed.
In addition, we also consider a random infection. In this case, the time
t is not used. Rather, each node independently becomes sick with a probability
q′. Then the expected number of sick nodes is determined by q′ rather than by
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time t, and is equal to q′n. By setting q′ appropriately, the expected infection
size can be normalized to a desired value.
Though we phrase the random sickness as being fixed in time, it is also
possible to imagine it as an infection spreading on a complete graph. Since
there is no structure distinguishing different nodes, the resulting sick nodes
would appear random. In this sense, distinguishing a random sickness from an
infection is the same problem as distinguishing two different infection graphs.
The main difference is that, even if the expected number of sick nodes is the
same, a random sickness has less variance than an infection on a complete
graph.
2.2.2 Reporting Model
After the infection proceeds for time t, a subset of the infected nodes
report. The reporting mechanism is simple, and identical for both processes.
At this time, each sick nodes decides to report their sickness independently
with probability q. We define the full set of sick nodes as S, and the set of
reporting nodes as Srep. Therefore, E[|Srep|] = qE[|S|]. If q is very small, then
we may only have a very small proportion of the sick nodes report, which is the
most difficult setting for this problem. In our theorems, we only require that
a logarithmic (in n) number of sick nodes report, even if the entire infection is
much larger. Both t and q may depend on n, and we write t(n) and q(n) when
it is necessary to make this dependence clear.
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2.2.3 Normalization
The goal in solving this problem is to use the ‘shape’ of the sick nodes to
determine the causative infection process. To highlight this, it is necessary to
remove other factors that could be used when possible. In particular, we must
remove differences in the expected number of infected nodes. If the expected
infection size was significantly different in each process, the infection size itself
would suffice to distinguish the two processes. For this reason, we want to
match to expected infection size. For the case of a random sickness, q′ (the
probability of a node being sick) is set so that q′n is equal to the expected size
of the epidemic.
2.2.4 Graphs
In order to analyze the asymptotic performance of our algorithms, we
consider infinite families of graphs, where the graph size has no upper limit.
Formally, we denote a family of graphs as G = {G(n)}. Each G(n) is a collection
of graphs G(n), each of degree n. For each of these, there is a (possibly trivial)
probability space
(
G(n), σ(G(n)), P (n)
)
. A series of graphs {G(n)} is chosen
from
∏
n G
(n), and an infection spreads on each graph as described as above.
Examples of families are d-dimensional grids, Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs, and trees.
An mentioned previously, the infection time t(n) and reporting probability q(n)
may depend on the graph size. We are interested primarily in the properties
of the infection as n → ∞. For additional clarity in our results, we drop the
superscript (n) when the n is clear from context.
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For this problem, we consider standard graph topologies representative
of the typical social networks. There are two main types of topologies to con-
sider. The first type are geographic topologies. These topologies are for social
networks where social contact is primarily from geographic proximity. The
distinguishing aspects of these graphs are the large number of local cycles and
absence of long range edges. That is, they have a relatively large diameter. A
convenient representative from these graphs are multidimensional grid graphs.
These graphs are be represented as a lattice, where adjacent points of the
lattice are connected by an edge. Such graphs exhibit the required properties
and are simple enough to analyze. We connect the opposing sides forming a
torus to avoid edge effects.
The second type of topology that must be represented is a tree-like
social network. These topologies have much lower diameters (logarithmic in
the size of the graph). Most social networks, especially over the Internet, fit in
this category. In addition, this problem is much more difficult on these types of
graphs because the infection spreads much faster. A suitable representative for
this graph topology is an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph. An Erdo¨s-Renyi graph is formed
by starting with a graph with no edges. Then an edge is randomly added
between each pair of nodes independently with a fixed probability. This type
of graph will exhibit the desired properties when the edge probability is set
appropriately. We also consider trees, which have the same local structure as
Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs. The performance of our algorithms on each these graphs
also provides an insightful contrast.
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These topologies represent our reference topologies for the purpose of
determining how the graph structure determines the performance of our al-
gorithms. In addition, we perform simulations on these graphs, as well as
graphs from real data, to evaluate our empirical performance and support our
theorems.
2.2.5 Error Probability
We assume the prior probability of both processes are equal. We label
the random sickness as Process 0 and the epidemic as Process 1. We phrase the
error probability in the language of hypothesis testing. The null hypothesis H0
is that Process 0 is the true infection process. Correspondingly, the alternative
hypothesis H1 is that Process 1 is the true infection process. The error where
the infection is caused by Process 0, but we label it Process 1, is termed a
Type I error. Likewise, when the infection is caused by Process 1, but we
believe it is caused by Process 0, it is a Type II error. Then the overall error
probability is the average of the Type I and Type II error probabilities.
Another major question to be resolved is how the algorithm’s perfor-
mance should be judged. The goal is to choose the correct infection process
with the minimum probability of error. One possible measure is the asymptotic
error rate of the algorithm. However, for many graphs, the error probability
does not decrease exponentially in the graph size, and the probability is highly
dependent on the expected infection size. The objective however is to estab-
lish a clear range of parameters for which this problem can be solved, so this
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measure is unsuitable.
For this reason, the performance of the algorithm will be measured in
the range of parameters (such as infection size) for which the probability of
error decays to 0 as the graph size increases without bound. Equivalently, we
are interested when both the Type I and Type II error probability decays to 0.
That is, the algorithm is measured by the range of parameters for which the
error probability eventually is low. Though the error probability may decay
slowly, this is a straight forward condition on when the algorithm succeeds,
allows for clear valid parameter ranges, and is relevant for all graph topologies.
2.2.6 Algorithms
The key idea we use is that when the sickness is due to an epidemic,
the sick nodes will be clustered on the graph. On the other hand, in a random
sickness, the nodes will be spread out evenly over the network. However, there
are multiple ways to measure clustering of sick nodes.
We use two methods to rate the clustering, ‘ball clustering’ and ‘tree
clustering’. These are the basis of the two algorithm we consider, the Threshold
Ball Algorithm and Threshold Tree Algorithm respectively. The idea of these
clustering is as follows. For ‘ball clustering’, we look at the smallest radius ball
that contains all the sick nodes. The radius of this ball acts as a ‘score’ for the
level of clustering. If the radius is small, then the sick nodes are well clustered.
On the other hand, if the radius is close to the radius of the entire graph, then
the sick nodes are heavily separated. For ‘tree clustering’, the ‘score’ is the
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number of nodes in the smallest tree containing all the sick nodes. In this
case, the measure can be also be phrased as the smallest possible infection
that could have resulted in the set of reporting sick nodes. Once the score
is determined, it is compared against a threshold determined either by the
infection time t or the number of reporting nodes.
To define our algorithms, we use the following definitions. With a
graph G, a node v, and radius r, we use Ballv,r(G) to denote the collection
of all nodes on G that are at a distance of no more than r from the central
node v, where graph distance is measured by hop-count. For any collection of
nodes S, we now denote by Ball(G,S) the smallest-radius ball that contains all
the nodes in S, and we let BallRadius(G,S) denote its corresponding radius.
Finally, let Tree(G,S) be the smallest subtree of G containing all nodes in
S, and TreeSize(G,S) be the number of nodes in this tree. The algorithm to
determine BallRadius(G,S) can be specified simply as follows.
Determining the size of the smallest tree containing all the sick nodes
is a more difficult problem. This tree is the minimum Steiner tree [29], and
finding it is an NP-hard problem. However, there are efficient algorithms that
give approximate solutions, guaranteeing no more than twice the optimum
number of nodes or better [44, 26].
From these measures of clustering, we can then define the Threshold
Ball Algorithm and Threshold Tree Algorithm. As mentioned, these algorithms
compute a ‘score’ rating the clustering of the sick nodes appear. If the score
is below a specified threshold (which would be set using the infection time t),
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Algorithm 1 BallRadius
Input: Graph G; Set of reporting sick nodes Srep;
Output: Radius r
k ←∞
for all v ∈ V do
d← 0
for all u ∈ Srep do
if dist(u, v) > d then
d← dist(u, v)
end if
end for
if d < k then
k ← d
end if
end for
return k
then the sick nodes are sufficiently clustered and algorithm labels the sickness
an epidemic.
Since it may not be possible to know the duration of the epidemic, we
also consider adaptive versions of these algorithms. In this case, the threshold
is determined by using the number of infected nodes and the graph topology
to estimate the infection time. With a sufficiently accurate estimate of the
infection time, the threshold can be computed as before. These algorithms are
analyzed in a similar way as the basic threshold algorithms.
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Algorithm 2 Threshold Ball Algorithm
Input: Graph G; Set of reporting sick nodes Srep
Parameters: Threshold m
Output: EPIDEMIC or RANDOM
k ← BallRadius(G,Srep)
if k ≤ m then
return EPIDEMIC
else
return RANDOM
end if
Algorithm 3 Threshold Tree Algorithm
Input: Graph G; Set of reporting sick nodes Srep
Parameters: Threshold m
Output: EPIDEMIC or RANDOM
k ← TreeSize(G,Srep)
if k ≤ m then
return EPIDEMIC
else
return RANDOM
end if
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2.3 Results
We prove that the probability of error tends to 0 for a reasonable range
of infection sizes. For grid graphs, the sufficient conditions to guarantee low
probability of error for the Threshold Ball Algorithm are looser than those for
the Threshold Tree Algorithm. That is, the Threshold Ball Algorithm seems
to perform better than the Threshold Tree Algorithm on a grid, and our sim-
ulation results reflect this as well. However, we have not proven necessary
conditions that confirm this result. For tree graphs, our results suggest that
the Threshold Tree Algorithm is slightly superior to the Threshold Ball Algo-
rithm. On Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs, the conditions are similar, but empirically, the
Threshold Ball Algorithm performs somewhat better. Overall, the Threshold
Ball Algorithm performs better and is much more efficient.
2.3.1 Grids
First we analyze the performance of our algorithms on grid graphs. Let
the graph G = Grid(n, d) be such a grid network with n nodes and dimension
d, so the side length is n1/d. We avoid edge effects by adding edges that wrap
from one side to the other, which makes the graph a torus. This modifica-
tion allows us to avoid dealing with additional complexities resulting from the
choice of the initial source of the infection.
In order to evaluate our algorithms on a grid, we need to understand
the expected shape of the epidemic. Since we model the time it takes the
infection to traverse an edge as an independent exponentially distributed ran-
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dom variable, the time a node is infected is the minimum sum of these random
variables over all paths between the infection origin and that node. This sim-
ply phrases the infection process in terms of first-passage percolation on this
graph. This allows us to use a result characterizing the ‘shape’ of an infec-
tion on this graph (see [34]). Let I(t) be the set of infected nodes at time t.
Identifying the nodes of the graph with points on the integer lattice embed-
ded in Rd with the infection starting at the origin, let us put a small `∞-ball
around each infected node. This allows us to simply state inner and outer
bounds for the shape of the infection. To this end, define this expanded set as
B(t) = I(t) + [−1/2, 1/2]d.
Lemma 2.3.1 ([34]). There exists a set B0 and constants C1 to C5 such that
for x ≤ √t,
P{B(t)/t ⊂ (1 + x/√t)B0} ≥ 1− C1t2de−C2x
and
P{(1− C3t−1/(2d+4)(log t)1/(d+2))B0 ⊂ B(t)/t}
≥ 1− C4td exp (−C5t(d+1)/(2d+4)(log t)1/(d+2)).
That is, the shape of the infected set B(t) can be well-approximated
by the region tB0. In addition, the variation of the edge is on the order of
√
t
or less.
Moreover, one can show that this set B0 is symmetrical and convex.
Define µ
4
= supx{(x, 0, ..., 0) ∈ B0}. That is, µ is effectively the rate the
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infection spreads along an axis. Then B0 contains an `
1-ball and is contained
in an `∞ ball: {x : ‖x‖1 ≤ µ} ⊂ B0 ⊂ [−µ, µ]d. Note that µ does not depend
on the realization of the process, only the dimension of the grid. Though this
result is for infinite grids, it applies to the torus case as well. One way to
see this is to label the nodes of an infinite grid ‘1’ to ‘n’ so that all nodes
where each coordinate is the same modulo n1/d have the same label, forming
an infinite pattern of the size n torus. Since the non-self-intersecting paths on
the torus correspond to such paths on this infinite grid, and the infection time
of a node is the minimum traversal time over all such paths, the infection on
the torus spreads no faster than it does on the infinite grid. In addition, we
consider only infection times sufficiently small that edge effects do not come
into play.
The second result we need is to show that the number of reporting
sick nodes is close to the expected number. This follows from the following
well-known Chernoff bound.
Lemma 2.3.2. If at least s nodes are sick, then the number of reporting nodes
will be at least (1− δ)qs with probability at least 1− exp(−(1− δ)2qs/2).
For each result, we first present sufficient conditions when the threshold
is based on the time t. When the time is known, the estimated expected
infection size and spread can be determined, which allows the threshold to
be set more accurately. However, the infection duration or speed would often
not be known. In that case, the infection time can be estimated from the
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number of reporting infected nodes, and the threshold can be set using this
estimation. With the adaptive thresholds, the maximum infection size in our
sufficient conditions is typically reduced by a factor of log n.
Theorem 2.3.3. Suppose the infection spreads on a grid, and we use the
Threshold Ball Algorithm. Suppose that the expected number of reporting nodes
scales at least as log n.
(a) Suppose t is known. Set the threshold m = 1.1dµt. Then there exists
constant C6 such that, if the expected number of infected nodes is less
than C6n,
P (error)→ 0.
(b) Next, suppose time t is unknown. Let Xrep be the number of nodes re-
porting an infection, |Srep|. Use threshold m = 1.1d2(Xrep log log n/q)1/d.
Then provided that for a constant C7, the expected number of infected
nodes is less than C7n/ log log n,
P (error)→ 0.
Proof outline. This theorem follows using the shape theorem given in Lemma
2.3.1: the epidemic will be contained within a ball with radius scaling linearly
with time. A simple counting argument is sufficient to show that the random
sickness will be sufficiently spread out. The proof details are given in the
appendix.
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Then for the Threshold Ball Algorithm, the infection can be identified
when up to a constant fraction of the network is infected. This is clearly order-
wise optimal. The reason this ball algorithm works so well is that the shape of
the infection can be well approximated by ball. This fact can be shown from
use percolation theory on infinite lattices [34]. We find that the Threshold Ball
Algorithm heavily outperforms the Threshold Tree Algorithm in this setting.
Theorem 2.3.4. Consider an infection spreading on a grid. Apply the Thresh-
old Tree Algorithm and assume the expected number of reporting nodes scales
at least as log n.
(a) Consider when t is known. Use threshold m = (3µt)d. Then there exists
constant C8 such that, if the expected number of infected nodes is less
than C8n/(log log n/q)
d,
P (error)→ 0.
(b) Consider unknown t. Define Xrep as the number of nodes reporting an
infection, as set the threshold to m = Xrep log log n/q. If there exists
constant C9 such that expected number of infected nodes is less than
C9n/(log log n/q)
3d,
P (error)→ 0.
Proof outline. The size of the Steiner tree for the epidemic is clearly no larger
than the size of the epidemic, so the Type II error probability clearly goes to
0. We lower bound the size of the Steiner tree containing a random sickness
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by dividing the grid into blocks, and showing the tree must travel through a
large number of these blocks. See the appendix for details.
2.3.2 Trees
In this section, we analyze the algorithm performance on a tree. A tree
is represents a simple type of social network, where there are no cycles that
complicate the infection process. Thus, let G be a balanced tree with n nodes,
constant branching ratio c, and a single root node a. To reduce edge effects,
we force the infection to start at the root of the tree instead of being randomly
placed. This makes the infection spread more evenly through the network and
not be bottlenecked by the root node (as it would be if the infection started
at a leaf node).
First, we provide sufficient conditions for the Threshold Ball Algorithm
to succeed with probability tending to 1. As before, the thresholds are first set
based on t, and an adaptive threshold is set based on the number of infected
nodes. A key fact used here is that on trees with a fixed branching distribution,
the infection speed (the graph distance from the root of the farther infected
node divided by the time) can be upper bounded with high probability as time
scales.
This speed bound follows from results in first passage percolation [7]. In
particular, one can compute the fastest-sustainable transit rate. This quantity
is basically the time from the root to the leaves, normalized for depth, as the
size of the tree scales. Formally (again, see [7] for details), let us consider
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a limiting process of trees whose size grows to infinity, with Γn denoting the
balanced tree on n nodes, and δ(Γn) denoting the set of paths from the root to
the leaves, and for a node v ∈ p for some path p ∈ δ(Γn), let Xv denote the time
it takes the infection to reach node v. Then the fastest-sustainable transit rate
is defined as: limn infp∈δ(Γn) lim supv∈p
Xv
depth(v)
. Basic results [7] show that this
quantity exists, and thus shows that the rate at which an infection travels,
defined as the maximum distance of the infection from the root over time,
converges to a constant b that depends on the branching ratio. The probability
that an infection travels at a faster rate converges (exponentially) to 0 in the
size of the tree.
Computing the speed constant may be difficult. One simple method
that is applicable to all graphs with maximum degree d¯, upper bounds the
infection process by an infection on a degree d¯ tree. See Section 3.3.3.2 for
additional detail regarding this technique. Then we can use a bound in [7] to
find that a degree d¯ tree satisfies the speed condition with speed 1.1(d¯ + 1).
Therefore, the original graph satisfies it with the same speed. Depending on
the graph structure, this bound may be weak.
Theorem 2.3.5. Suppose G is a balanced tree with constant branching ratio
and the Threshold Ball Algorithm is used. Additionally, suppose t is sufficiently
large that the expected number of reporting nodes is at least log n.
(a) In the case t is known, there exist constants b, β such that if the expected
number of infected nodes is less than nβ, then the algorithm with threshold
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m = 1.1bt succeeds:
P (error)→ 0.
(b) On the other hand, suppose t is not known. Define Xrep as |Srep|.
Then there exists constants b2 and β, such that with the threshold set
to m = 1.1b2 log(Xrep(log log n)
2/q), where if the expected number of in-
fected nodes is less than nβ,
P (error)→ 0.
The constant β is identical in both parts (a) and (b).
Proof outline. This result follows using the speed bound for trees. In addition,
the random sickness (nearly) always contains a leaf node under the given
conditions, and therefore can only be covered by a ball of maximum size. The
details of the proof are presented in the appendix.
That is, there is some exponent β < 1 such that, as long as the expected
number of infected nodes is less than nβ, the Threshold Ball Algorithm works
well on a tree. Next, we consider the Threshold Tree Algorithm.
Theorem 2.3.6. Consider a balanced tree G with constant branching ratio and
suppose that the Threshold Tree Algorithm is applied to this problem. Suppose
q = ω(log log n/ log n), and t is sufficiently large that the expected number of
reporting nodes is at least log n.
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(a) Consider when t is known. Then for any constant α < 1, if the expected
number of infected nodes scales as less than nα, with threshold m =
E[|S|] log log n,
P (error)→ 0.
(b) Suppose t is not known. Set Xrep = |Srep|, the number of nodes reporting
an infection. Use threshold m = Xrep(log log n)
3/q. Then if for any
constant α < 1, the expected number of infected nodes is less than nα,
P (error)→ 0.
Proof outline. We again can upper bound the Steiner tree size of the epidemic
by the size of the epidemic itself. Lower bounds on the Steiner tree size for the
random sickness are obtained by showing the tree must include most of the
branches down to a certain depth due to the large number of sick leaf nodes.
See the appendix for the complete details of the proof.
Note that the Ball Algorithm succeeds until the farthest infected node
reaches the edge of the graph. At this point, the ball radius can increase no
further, thus there is no hope of distinguishing an epidemic from a random
sickness. Since this farthest point travels at a faster rate than the bulk of
the infection, the Ball Algorithm can only work up to some time logc n/b.
However, the Tree Algorithm can still correctly identify an infection with high
probability nearly to the point where Θ(n) nodes are sick. This includes
infection times close to logc n, the time it takes for almost every node to be
30
infected. From this, we see that the Tree Algorithm works for a wider range of
times compared to the Ball Algorithm. This is demonstrated by simulations
in Section 2.4.
2.3.3 Erdo¨s-Renyi Graphs:
The final graph we consider are Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs. These represent
standard social networks, with both a small diameter and rapid epidemics.
Both of these factors make this problem more challenging. Define the graph
G = G(n, p) to be the graph with n nodes and for each pair of nodes, there
is an edge between them with probability p. In the section above, we used
c to denote the branching ratio. We overload notation and use it again to
measure the spread of the graph, but here as the (approximate) expected
degree: let p = c/n with c > 1. In this regime, the graph is almost surely
disconnected, but there is a giant component. Since this problem would be
trivial on a disconnected graph, we limit both the epidemic and random sick
nodes to the giant component. Unlike the case of trees, we are unable to
distinguish infection from random sickness for close to a constant fraction of
nodes. Instead, we consider infections that cover only o(n) nodes. As is well-
known (e.g., [18]) in this connectivity regime, the graph is locally tree-like, and
hence tree-like in the infected region. Then locally, the infection behaves very
similar to the trees in the last section, and as might be expected, our results
are similar.
As before, first we analyze the Threshold Ball Algorithm.
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Theorem 2.3.7. Suppose we use the Threshold Ball Algorithm with G =
G(n, p). Consider the case when the expected number of reporting nodes is no
less than log n.
(a) Suppose we have knowledge of t. There are constants b3, β2 where, using
threshold m = 1.1b3t and with expected number of infected nodes less
than nβ2,
P (error)→ 0.
(b) Consider unknown t. We set Xrep to be the number of nodes reporting
an infection, |Srep|. Then there exists constants b4 and β2 such that for
threshold m = b4 log(Xrep(log log n)
2/q) and if the expected number of
infected nodes is less nβ2,
P (error)→ 0.
The constant β2 is the same for both (a) and (b).
Proof outline. The Type II error probability is shown to be low using a similar
speed result as in the case for trees. Neighborhood size bounds are used to
establish that a random sickness is spread out so the Type I error rate also
decays. The details of the proof are presented in the appendix.
Therefore, the form of the sufficient condition is the same as for trees:
for a constant β2, the Threshold Ball Algorithm will succeed for expected
infection size up to nβ2 . However, this constant β2 is not the same as β from
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the previous section. The condition for the Threshold Tree Algorithm is easier
to compare.
Theorem 2.3.8. Suppose G = G(n, p). Also suppose the Threshold Tree
Algorithm is applied. Assume that the expected number of reporting nodes is
at least log n and q is constant.
(a) Consider the case where t is known. Let the threshold m = E[|S|] log log n.
For any α < 1/2, if the expected number of infected nodes scales as less
than nα,
P (error)→ 0.
(b) Suppose we have unknown t. Define Xrep as |Srep|. In this case, set the
threshold to be m = Xrep(log log n)
3/q. Then like before, for any constant
α < 1/2, if the expected number of infected nodes is less than nα,
P (error)→ 0.
Proof outline. Again, we use the size of the epidemic to bound the size of the
Steiner tree containing the reporting nodes in that case. Bounding the size of
the Steiner tree of the random sickness is much harder. We examine the value
equal to the sum over all reporting nodes of the distance from that node to the
nearest reporting node. It can be shown that the Steiner tree size is at least
half this value. Using appropriate bounds on neighborhood sizes, we lower
bound this quantity. The proof details can be found in the appendix.
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Then, the Threshold Tree Algorithm algorithm works for exponents up
to 1/2, as opposed to 1 for a tree. For the Erdo¨s-Renyi graph, the sufficient
condition for the ball and tree algorithms are not directly comparable. Our
simulations results are similar. The Threshold Tree Algorithm has a lower error
probability at smaller infections sizes, but the Threshold Ball Algorithm works
better for larger infections, when the problem is more challenging. Overall,
the Threshold Ball Algorithm seems superior for this graph topology.
2.4 Simulations
In this section we provide simulation-based evidence of the theoreti-
cal results of the previous sections. The simulations aim to demonstrate, in
particular, two facts. First, the thresholds specified in the previous sections
do actually work empirically: as the graph size increases, the probability of
both types of error decrease to zero. In addition, this provides insight into
how quickly the probability of error decays. While our results include rate
estimates given as part of the proof of correctness, we have not made an effort
to optimize these in this work. Second, we seek to describe the relative per-
formance of each algorithm, and show that it is as described above. Thus, we
show that the Ball Algorithm outperforms the Tree Algorithm on a grid; the
Tree Algorithm performs better than the Ball Algorithm on a balanced tree
(for larger infections); and on an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph, the performances are
similar, with the Ball Algorithm performing slightly better. We accomplish
this by determining the probability of error for a range of infection times. We
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call an algorithm superior if it works in a wider range of times.
2.4.1 Methodology
We executed both of our algorithms under a variety of conditions to
estimate the probability of error. In order to use the Threshold Tree Algorithm
in a reasonable time frame, it was necessary to use an approximate Steiner
tree algorithm. Naturally, since the exact problem is NP-hard, this would
be required in any practical use of this algorithm at the moment. However,
as a consequence, the empirical results may differ from the true theoretical
result that would be obtained by employing an exact algorithm. Nevertheless,
approximation algorithms typically have reasonable performance and we do
not expect significant deviation from the correct results. The approximation
algorithm we use is the Mehlhorn 2-approximation algorithm provided by the
Goblin library [44]. This algorithm is an efficient algorithm which produces a
Steiner tree with no more than twice the optimal number of edges.
Each of the points in these results represents the average of 10000 runs.
The average infection size, which is used to normalize the expected infection
size in a random sickness, was determined by averaging the results of 10000
infections. For each simulation, we use a reporting probability q = 0.25 (unless
otherwise specified), and other parameters (n, t and m) as specified in each
section below. Finally, the graphs are plotted with error bars at one standard
deviation.
35
2.4.2 Error Rate Versus Graph Size
Though our theoretical results have characterized the range for which
each algorithm works, naturally we wish to see empirically the error proba-
bility for each algorithm and the rate at which the error decreases as graph
size increases. Both Type I and Type II error probabilities were determined
for each algorithm and graph topology. For this section, we have chosen time
to keep the fraction of infected nodes at a consistent scaling. In particular,
t = 0.2
√
n for the grid, and t = 0.5 log(0.5n) with p = 2/n for the Erdo¨s-Renyi
graph. The exact constants for these scalings were chosen empirically so that
the probability of error was low and the Type I and Type II errors were as bal-
anced as possible. The thresholds m were also chosen with the same scaling,
according to our theoretical results. To be exact, for the grid, the Threshold
Ball Algorithm used threshold m = 0.75
√
n and the Threshold Tree Algo-
rithm used threshold m = 0.28n. For the Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs, the Threshold
Ball Algorithm used threshold m = 0.69 log(4.33n) and the Threshold Tree
Algorithm used threshold m = 0.03
√
n log n log n.
Figure 2.2 presents our results for grid graphs. The error probability
of the Threshold Ball Algorithm on a grid is very low, while the tree algo-
rithm performs relatively poorly. This is expected since the Threshold Ball
Algorithm is closely aligned with the shape of an epidemic on this graph. The
Threshold Tree Algorithm has a much higher error probability which decays
slowly with n, in particular the Type II error.
Next, the results for Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs are in Figure 2.3. Here we see
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again that the Threshold Ball Algorithm performs better than the Threshold
Tree Algorithm, at least for larger n, and that the error probability also seems
to be decreasing faster for the Threshold Ball Algorithm as well. Though
a tree more closely matches the infection shape on an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph,
it is also easier for a random sickness to mimic a small tree, especially for
small world graphs like Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs. This causes the Threshold Ball
Algorithm to be ultimately superior. The Threshold Tree Algorithm is superior
for larger infection sizes on bottle necked graphs (such as trees) where the
random sickness can be easily distinguished, as we see in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.3 Error Rate Versus Infection Size
Next, we examine empirically how the infection duration affects the
probability of error for each of our algorithms. As discussed above, we compare
the two algorithms by the range of infection sizes for which they work, and
accordingly, we call an algorithm superior if it maintains a lower probability
of error for a larger infection size (fraction of total infected nodes). We use
thresholds that minimize the empirical overall probability of error. That is,
the sickness was chosen to be either an infection or simply random with equal
probability, and the threshold with minimum probability of error from the
simulations was chosen.
These results are presented in Figure 2.4 for grids, trees, and Erdo¨s-
Renyi graphs. For each of the graph topologies, we used a graph size of
n = 1600. The error probability is plotted against the average infection size
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Figure 2.2: Empirical Type I and Type II error probability vs graph size for grid graphs.
The sample size is 10000 and infection size scales linearly with n.
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Figure 2.3: Empirical Type I and Type II error probability vs graph size for graphs
G(n, 2/n). The sample size is 10000 and infection size scales order-wise as
√
n.
39
from the simulation. This choice better conveys how infection size affects the
error rate, which is the chief question of interest.
These charts allow us to compare the performance of the algorithms.
It is clear that the error probability of the Threshold Ball Algorithm is less
than that of the Threshold Tree Algorithm on both the grid and Erdo¨s-Renyi
graphs. On these graphs, the Threshold Ball Algorithm performs uniformly
better across variations in fraction of nodes infected. However, the results on
a tree are more complex. When the total infection is small, the Threshold Ball
Algorithm has superior performance. However, as a larger fraction of the net-
work becomes infected, the Threshold Tree Algorithm has better performance.
We believe it is this right tail that is most significant. In the regime where
many of the nodes are infected, the infection is likely to have reached some of
the leaves by this time, thus explaining the superiority of the Threshold Tree
Algorithm in this regime.
However, many practical applications of these algorithms would occur
when the infection is still of limited size, in which case the Threshold Ball
Algorithm would perform better. The best algorithm would depend on the
circumstances.
It is particularly interesting to ask how these results extend to real-
world graphs, as opposed to random (or highly regular) graphs that we have
constructed. To this end, we used the call-graph from an Asian telecom net-
work. In this graph, each node is a cell customer, and there is an edge between
two users if they contacted each other over this network during a certain range
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Figure 2.4: This figure shows the overall error probability for each algorithm, for each of
the three topologies we consider, over a range of infection sizes.
41
of time. Since the original graph was too large for practical simulation times,
we cut out a partial subset. We chose a random node and all nodes with a
distance 9 and used the induced subgraph generated by these nodes. The re-
sulting graph has size n = 13189. The probability of error for a range infection
sizes are presented in Figure 2.5. We see that the results are similar to those
for a Tree graph, where the Threshold Ball Algorithm performs better on small
infections, but it is out performed by the Threshold Tree Algorithm in larger
infections. This is to be expected, as the intuition for the Threshold Ball Al-
gorithm stems from the geometry of spatial grid-like networks. The call-graph
here is very much tree-like (with very small diameter and high degree), and
infections are unlikely to propagate to the same depth across various leaves.
This results in poor ball “fits,” especially as the infected fraction of nodes
grows. This intuition is indeed borne out in the simulations.
2.4.4 Error Rate Versus Reporting Probability
The final simulation focused on determining how varying the report-
ing probability affects the probability of error. Our theoretic results do not
provide any intuition on the how the error probability will change as the re-
porting probability increases, and simply require a minimum reporting proba-
bility (sufficiently large so that at least log n nodes report) for good algorithm
performance. To provide this otherwise absent information, we simulated the
Threshold Ball Algorithm on a grid graph with 1600 nodes. We used epidemic
durations of t = 10 and t = 11, close to the threshold where the probability
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of error for the algorithm begins to increase rapidly. The threshold m was set
to the optimum value as determined empirically. The average probability of
error, with epidemic and random sickness equally likely, are shown in Figure
2.6.
The figure shows that at very low reporting probabilities, the error
probability is high. However, the probability of error decreases rapidly as
q increases. Once q reaches a value where approximately 40% of infected
noded report their infection, the error probability is near a minimum and
increased knowledge of the reporting nodes does not substantially improve
the algorithm’s performance. Note that there is a slight jump in the error
probability around q = 0.6 which is caused by the fact that the threshold
must be an integer, and this jump represents when the threshold increases by
one.
2.5 Conclusion
We develop the Threshold Ball Algorithm and the Threshold Tree Al-
gorithm, and show that these algorithms can distinguish between a random
sickness and an epidemic on a variety of graph topologies. A summary of the
maximum infection size for which our algorithms succeed from our sufficient
conditions is shown in Table 2.1 (where reporting probability is constant).
From our analytic and empirical results, we conclude that the ball based al-
gorithm is superior. It is more efficient and has a lower probability of error
for most of our tests. In later chapters of this thesis, we focus on the ball
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Figure 2.5: This figure shows the overall error probability for each algorithm on a real
world graph.
Figure 2.6: The error probability of the Threshold Ball Algorithm on a grid graph (n =
1600) for a large range of reporting probabilities, with a sample size of 10000.
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algorithm and variations of it.
Table 2.1: Summary of maximum proven distinguishable infection sizes.
Graph Ball Algorithm Tree Algorithm
Grid Θ(n) Θ(n/(log log n)d)
Tree Θ(nβ) Θ(n1−)
Erdo¨s-Renyi Θ(nβ2) Θ(n1/2−)
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Chapter 3
Distinguishing Two Infections
3.1 Introduction
People and devices routinely interact through multiple networks – con-
tact networks – be they virtual, technological or physical, allowing the rapid
exchange of ideas, fashions, rumors, but also viruses and disease. Through-
out this paper we refer to anything that spreads over a contact network as
an epidemic. In many domains, it is of critical importance to understand the
causative network of that epidemic. Economists, sociologists and marketing
departments alike have long sought to understand how ideas, memes, fads
and fashions, spread through social networks. Meanwhile, epidemiology has
understood the value of knowing the causative network of disease epidemics,
from Influenza to HIV. Indeed, at one point, HIV was known as the “4H dis-
ease” where 4H referred to “Haitians, Homosexuals, Hemophiliacs, and Heroin
users” [62, 12]. Understanding the causative network has greatly contributed
to controlling the worldwide spread of the virus.
The work in this chapter appears in the following publication:
Chris Milling, Constantine Caramanis, Shie Mannor, and Sanjay Shakkottai. On identifying
the causative network of an epidemic. In Proceedings of 50th Annual Allerton Conference
on Communication, Control, and Computing, October 2012.
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While smartphone viruses have not yet supplanted computer viruses
as the spreading technological threat of the hour, their potential for broad
destructive impact is clear. Just as different human viruses may have dif-
ferent dominant spreading networks (again, compare Influenza and HIV), so
may smartphone viruses spread over multiple networks, including bluetooth,
SMS/MMS messaging, or e-mail. Yet the symptoms of these viruses may be
deceptive, appearing to be simple hardware failure, and may disguise the true
infection mechanism.
A first step towards containing epidemics, be they technological or phys-
ical, relies on properly understanding the phenomenon as an epidemic in the
first place, and then, accurately understanding the causative spread, before
then adopting network-specific strategies for containment, quarantining and
treatment.
Many factors complicate the process of determining the causative net-
work. First, possibly because of long latency/hibernation periods, variation
in reporting/detection, or simply lack of data, in some cases it may be diffi-
cult or impossible to collect accurate longitudinal data. Equally importantly,
the reporting set of those infected (be they people or devices) may be only a
tiny fraction of those in fact infected. We consider the most dire information
regime: we assume we have data from only a single snapshot of time, where
only a (perhaps vanishing) fraction of the infected population reports.
With these data, this paper focuses on determining the causative net-
work for the spread of an epidemic (e.g., virus, sickness, or opinion) from
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limited samples of the network state. We do this in the setting where we
are given two possible graphs over which epidemic may spread. Provided the
networks are sufficiently distinct, we use the topological differences of the in-
fection on each graph to determine which network represents the true infection
process.
3.2 Problem Statement
In this section, we detail the infection model and required graph prop-
erties. We specify our proposed algorithm, the Comparative Ball Algorithm,
which we analyze throughout the rest of this chapter.
3.2.1 Infection Model
We assume that an epidemic is propagating on one of the two graphs,
G1 or G2. The objective is to determine on which network it is spreading.
We reiterate that this ‘epidemic’ could model many situations, including the
spread of a cellphone virus, physical sickness of humans, and opinions or in-
fluence about products or ideas.
Given that the epidemic is on graph Gi, the spread occurs as follows
(the standard SI dynamics [20]). A node is randomly selected to be the epi-
demic seed, and thus is the first infected node. At random times, the illness
spreads from the sick nodes to some subset of the neighbors of the sick nodes,
according to an exponential process. Specifically, associate an independent
mean 1 exponential random variable with each edge incident to an infected
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and an uninfected (a susceptible) node. The realization of this random variable
represents the transit time of the infection across that specific edge. Thus an
infected node proceeds to infect its neighbors, with each non-infected neigh-
bor becoming infected after the random transit time associated with the edge
between the infected node and this neighbor. This process proceeds until
eventually the entire graph Gi is infected.
In either case, the infection continues until some time t(n). At this time,
a sub-sample of the infected nodes report their infection state independently,
each with some probability q(n) < 1. Both t(n) and q(n) may depend on the
total number of nodes n. We let S(n) denote the set of infected nodes, and let
S
(n)
rep ⊆ S(n) be the set of reporting infected nodes. Note that S(n) is a function
of t(n) and S
(n)
rep is a function of both t(n) and q(n). On the causative network of
the infection, S(n) will be a clustered, connected set of nodes. Unless required
for clarity, we suppress the dependence on n and write t, q, S and Srep for the
infection time, reporting probability, set of infected nodes, and set of reporting
nodes respectively.
3.2.2 Graph Independence
For the statistical problem of distinguishing the causative network to
be well-posed, the contact networks encoded by graphs G1 and G2 must be
sufficiently different. Note that this does not imply that the topology of the
graphs must be different (indeed, it could be identical). Rather, the neighbor-
hoods of each graph must be distinct, i.e., the nodes that are near an infected
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node with respect to one graph, must be different from the nodes near the same
infected node, with respect to the other graph. We note that if this is not the
case, then both graphs encode approximately the same causative network, and
hence solving the comparative graph problem is not that important.
In this paper, we encode this idea of graphs having sufficiently differ-
ent neighborhoods via a probabilistic construction that guarantees that cor-
responding nodes on the two graphs have independent neighborhoods. This
essentially means that given a node, v, its neighborhood in G1 and its neigh-
borhood in G2 are independent. We suppose that both graphs G1 and G2 come
from graph families G1 and G2 as defined in Section 2.2.4. For each pair of
these graphs, we require them to have independent neighborhoods as defined
by the following construction.
Definition 3.2.1. Graphs G1 and G2 have independent neighborhoods if their
nodes are labeled as follows. Let V be the set of nodes in the population under
consideration. These nodes are mapped to the nodes in G1 and G2 (V1 and
V2) by uniformly random labeling functions. That is, let label1 : V1 7→ V be
a one-to-one function where the mapping is chosen uniformly at random. Let
label2 be likewise defined for V2, and independently from label1. Two nodes
are identified if they receive the same label (that is, map to the same vertex
in the population V ), and hence are both infected or both well. Hence we can
talk about a single set of common nodes, and then edges that come from G1,
and edges that come from G2.
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For a set of nodes I, define L1(I) =
⋃
i∈I{label1(i)} and similarly for
L2. Then when G1 and G2 have independent neighborhoods as defined above,
for any pair of sets of nodes I1 ⊂ V1 and I2 ⊂ V2, L1(I1) and L2(I2) are inde-
pendent. In particular, a set of clustered nodes on one graph may correspond
to any possible set of nodes on the other graph, each equally likely.
This independent neighborhood condition is simply one way to make
precise, and encode into a probabilistic framework, the natural condition that
two graphs have neighborhoods that are “unrelated.” For a practical example,
consider the bluetooth contact graph during a commuter’s subway transit to
work in a busy city, compared to the e-mail contact graph. The majority
of people on the subway are typically strangers and hence do not exchange e-
mails; meanwhile the majority of co-workers and friends have different morning
commutes, and hence are not in bluetooth range during the morning commute.
That is, nodes (in this case, people) that are connected or nearby on one graph
(the proximity graph) may be spread out on the other graph (the e-mail contact
graph). The distances between pairs of nodes on each graph are approximately
independent.
On the causative network, the epidemic will consist of a connected, clus-
tered set of infected nodes. However, due to the above condition, the infection
will appear to be a completely random sickness on the other graph. That is,
the infection will only be clustered on the network over which the infection
spread. This fact can be exploited to determine the correct network. Fig-
ure 3.1 shows an example of two graphs that have indepedent neighborhoods.
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13 14 15 16
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
3 1 9 16
14 2 7 5
13 15 8 4
10 12 6 11
Figure 3.1: This figure shows two different graphs with the random labels from
the independent neighborhood condition shown. Infected nodes are colored
red. Note that nodes with the same label have the same status (e.g. both are
infected).
Note that the infection on the right-hand graph is unclustered.
3.2.3 Comparative Ball Algorithm
We provide an algorithm for this problem called the Comparative Ball
Algorithm. The algorithm is natural, given the discussion above. We find the
smallest ball on that graph that contains all the reporting infected nodes. We
take the ratio of the radius of this ball to that of the graph’s diameter. These
ratios – called the score of each graph – serve as a topology independent mea-
sure of clustering on each graph. The Comparative Ball Algorithm returns the
graph with the smallest normalized clustering ratio. This is formally described
below.
For the below algorithm, define Ball(G,S) as (possibly one of) the
ball containing all the nodes in S with the minimum radius, and denote the
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radius of this ball as RadiusBall(G,S). As we have done above, we denote the
diameter of the graph by diam(G).
Algorithm 4 Comparative Ball Algorithm
Input: Two graphs, G1 and G2; Set of reporting infected nodes Srep;
Output: G1 or G2
a1 ← RadiusBall(G1, Srep)
b1 ← diam(G1)
x1 ← a1/b1
a2 ← RadiusBall(G2, Srep)
b2 ← diam(G2)
x2 ← a2/b2
if x1 ≤ x2 then
return G1
else
return G2
end if
3.3 Main Results
We analyze the performance of the Comparative Ball Algorithm for
a wide variety of graph topologies. To do this, we impose two fairly mild
conditions on the graphs, termed the speed condition and the spread condition.
If both graphs satisfy these conditions, then we prove that the Comparative
Ball Algorithm correctly identifies the causative network with probability of
error tending to zero asymptotically for a wide range of infection size. In fact,
the algorithm is order-wise optimal in the maximum infection size for which
is succeeds. We then show that two standard graph topologies, grids and
Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs, satisfy the required conditions.
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3.3.1 Graph Conditions
Distinguishing between two graphs is only meaningful when neither
graph has a trivial neighborhood structure. For instance, if one graph is the
complete graph, there is no topological information conveyed by knowing which
nodes are sick on that graph, and the problem is roughly equivalent to the ran-
dom sickness vs. infection case. The first order of business is understanding
precisely what conditions we require the topology of graphs G1 and G2 to sat-
isfy, making precise the notion of “non-trivial neighborhood structure” where,
unlike for example the star graph, an epidemic exhibits some statistically de-
tectable clustering. There are two key properties required: first, the infection
must spread at a bounded speed; second, a random collection of nodes on the
graph must, with high probability, not exhibit a strong clustering. Of course,
the star graph fails with respect to the minimum spread of random nodes con-
dition. As another example that fails the bounded speed condition, consider
a tree whose nodes have degree dk+1 at level k.
We now state these conditions precisely, and in addition, we show,
many graphs satisfy these conditions, including familiar topologies like the d-
dimensional grid and the Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs. It is also easy to see that any
graph with bounded degree also satisfies these two conditions.
We first restate the following definition:
Definition 3.3.1. Given a graph G = (V,E) and a subset of its nodes, S ⊆ V ,
let RadiusBall(G,S) denote the radius of the smallest ball that contains S.
54
Note that for any set S, RadiusBall(G,S) can be easily computed in
time O(|V |2 · |S|).
Let G = {G(n)} denote a family of graphs, where G(n) denotes the subset
of the graphs of G that have n nodes. For each n, there is a (possibly trivial)
probability space
(
G(n), σ(G(n)), P (n)
)
from which graphs are drawn. Concrete
examples include the set of d-dimensional grid graphs, Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs
with bounded expected degree, d-regular trees, etc.
Definition 3.3.2. A family G satisfies the speed and spread conditions, if there
exist constants sG, bG and βG, such that for sequences {G(n)} picked randomly
from the product probability space
∏
n G
(n), the following hold with probability
approaching 1 as n increases, where the probability is over the random subset
of nodes in the definitions below, and, in the case of random families, G, such
as Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs, over the selection of G(n) as well:
Speed Condition: For infections starting at a randomly selected node,
and for infection times t(n) → ∞, the set S(n) of nodes infected at time
t(n) satisfies RadiusBall(G(n), S(n)) < sGt
(n) with probability tending to
1 as n increases.
Spread Condition: First, diam(G(n)) = Ω(log n). Define S(n) as a set
of nodes chosen uniformly at random from all nodes in G(n) (as in a
random sickness), with
∣∣S(n)∣∣ > βG log n. Given such a set, we require
that RadiusBall(G(n), S(n)) > bGdiam(G
(n)) with probability approaching
1 as n increases.
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These two conditions essentially encode the properties required so that
an infection spreading on a graph G
(n)
1 (chosen from family G1) exhibits clus-
tering, and, conversely, if it is spreading on another graph G
(n)
2 (chosen from
family G2) with independent neighborhoods (as described above) then there is
no clustering with respect to G
(n)
1 .
Note that to ease notation, whenever the context is clear, we drop the
superscript (n) that denotes the number of nodes.
If a graph G satisfies both of these conditions, we say that the graph
is ‘detectable’. An infection on a detectable graph is sufficiently well behaved
that it is possible is detect whether it is likely that an infection spread on that
graph.
3.3.2 Main Theorem
Using the algorithm definition, we prove sufficient conditions for the
probability of error of the Comparative Ball Algorithm decaying to 0.
Theorem 3.3.1. Consider families of graphs G1 and G2 satisfying the speed
and spread conditions above and with independent neighborhoods, and let the
sequence {(G(n)1 , G(n)2 )} denote a sequence of graphs drawn from G1 and G2.
Consider infection times t(n) such that the number of reporting infected nodes
scales at least as max(βG1 , βG2) log n. Then when the infection spreads over G1,
if t < bG2diam(G1)/sG1, the Comparative Ball Algorithm correctly determines
G1 is the causative network with probability approaching 1. Similarly, for an
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infection on G2, if t < bG1diam(G2)/sG2, then the Comparative Ball Algorithm
correctly identifies the infection with probability approaching 1.
Proof. By symmetry, it is sufficient to prove that an infection spreading on G1
is indeed detected as such. Suppose then, that G1 is the causative network.
For every n, let Srep (again we suppress dependence on n when it is clear from
the context) denote the set of reporting sick nodes, where |Srep| > βG2 log n.
Though Srep will be clustered on G1 since it is the causative network, by the in-
dependent neighborhood assumption, this set of nodes is randomly distributed
overG2. By the speed and spread conditions, with probability approaching 1 as
n scales, RadiusBall(G1, Srep) < sG1t and RadiusBall(G2, Srep) > bG2diam(G2).
Then the score for the first graph satisfies score(G1) < sG1t/diam(G1) < bG2 by
hypothesis. Similarly, score(G2) > bG2diam(G2)/diam(G2) = bG2 . Therefore,
the algorithm correctly identifies an infection.
Note in particular that sG and bG are constants for both graph families.
Therefore, the algorithm can distinguish infections for infection times order-
wise the same as the diameter of the graph. Since the infection spreads at a
constant rate 1, the diameter of the graph is also order-wise the same time as
it would take to infect the entire network. Naturally, it would be impossible
to distinguish infections at the point when infection has spread over the whole
network. Hence, Theorem 3.3.1 guarantees that the algorithm distinguishes
infections for infection times that are order-wise optimal.
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3.3.3 Detectable Graphs
Though we show that our Comparative Ball Algorithm performs well
on detectable graphs, it is as yet unclear what graphs are detectable, and
hence how meaningful our result is. In fact, our speed and spread conditions
are fairly mild and are satisfied by many typical graph topologies. To illustrate
this fact, we prove that grids and Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs satisfy these conditions
using the similar ideas as in Chapter 2.
Theorem 3.3.2. Both d-dimensional grids, and the giant component of Erdo¨s-
Renyi graphs with constant average degree, are detectable.
Proof. This result follows immediately from Lemmas 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, and
3.3.6 presented below.
3.3.3.1 Grids
First, we consider d dimension grids of size n. A grid consist of a lattice
of nodes with side length n1/d. In order to avoid edge effects, we connect each
node on the edge to its corresponding node on the other side, forming a torus.
This also means the initial infected node does not effect the way the epidemic
spreads. Grids serve as a useful model of geographic social networks, where
nodes is close physical proximity are connected. These are characterized by a
large number of small cycles and a relatively large diameter.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let G(n) = Grid(n, d) and let t(n) denote any sequence of
increasing times, t(n) → ∞. As defined above, S(n)rep denotes the (random)
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subset of nodes infected by the epidemic, that report their infected status. Then
there exists a constant µ such that
RadiusBall(G(n), S(n)rep) < 1.1dµt
(n),
with probability converging to 1 as n→∞.
Proof. We drop the indexing w.r.t. n, since the context is clear. Let µ
4
=
supx{(x, 0, ..., 0) ∈ B0} from Lemma 2.3.1 and m = 1.1dµt. Then we must
show RadiusBall(G,Srep) < m with probability approaching 1. Note that if
the infection can be limited to the subgrid [−m/d,m/d]d (with appropriate
translations), then this condition is satisfied. Define E as the event that
RadiusBall(G,Srep) ≥ m. Therefore, using Lemma 2.3.1,
P (E) < 1− P{B(t) ⊂ [−m/d,m/d]d}
< C1t
2de−C2t
−1/2(m/(dµ)−t) (3.1)
= C1t
2de−0.1C2t
1/2
→ 0.
Equation 3.1 follows from Lemma 2.3.1 with x = t−1/2(m/(dµ) − t), using
[−m/d,m/d]d ⊃ m/(dµ)B0 = (t+ t1/2x)B0. Hence, RadiusBall(G,Srep) satis-
fies the required bound with high probability.
Lemma 3.3.4. Let G(n) = Grid(n, d). Let S(n) be a collection of nodes chosen
uniformly at random from G(n), such that
∣∣S(n)∣∣ > log n for sufficiently high
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n. Then
RadiusBall(G(n), S(n)) > n1/d/4,
with probability converging to 1 as n→∞.
Proof. Again we drop the n-index wherever context makes it clear. By as-
sumption, we have a set S of random nodes with |S| > log n. Define X = |S|.
We show the probability all nodes in S are within some ball of radius n1/d/4
decays to 0 with n. There are at most n of these balls, since each node is in
correspondence with the ball centered on itself (though two different centers
may result in the same ball). Then consider one of these balls. There are less
than l = (n1/d/2)d nodes in that region (the number of nodes in a ‘box’ of
side n1/d/2). Within this ball, there are at most
(
l
X
)
arrangements of the sick
nodes out of
(
n
X
)
total possible arrangements. Therefore, the probability all
the sick nodes are within the region is no more than(
l
X
)/(n
X
)
=
l!(n−X)!
(l −X)!n!
≤ (l/n)X .
Using a union bound over the n balls, we find that the probability there
is a ball of that size containing all nodes in S is at most n(l/n)X . Then
n(l/n)X < n
(
1
2d
)logn
= n1−d log 2
→ 0.
Therefore, RadiusBall(G,S) > n1/d/4 with probability converging to 1.
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Since the diameter of a grid is (nearly) d/2n1/d, we see that a grid
satisfies both the speed condition (Lemma 3.3.3) and the spread condition
(Lemma 3.3.4), and hence grids are detectable.
3.3.3.2 Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs
Now we consider Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs, representing infections that spread
over low diameter networks (the diameter grows logarithmically with network
size). An Erdo¨s-Renyi graph is a random graph with n nodes, where there is
an edge between any pair of nodes, independently with probability p. These
graphs are denoted G(n, p). We study the Erdo¨s-Renyi graph in the regime
where p = c/n, for some positive constant c > 1. This setting leads to a
disconnected graph; however, there exists a giant connected component with
Θ(n) nodes with high probability in the large n regime. In this paper, we
restrict our attention to epidemics on this giant component. Thus we limit
both the infection and the random set of reporting nodes (due to the labeling
when the infection occurs on the alternative graph) to occur exclusively on the
giant connected component. If the infection on the other graph contains too
many nodes for the giant component, we simply ignore the excess, but this
point is already outside the regime of interest.
In order to establish that the Erdo¨s-Renyi graph is detectable, we show
first that on these graphs, an infection spreads at a bounded speed, and second,
that randomly selected nodes are spread out. In fact, the two results given in
this section also hold for bounded-degree graphs. The key properties used in
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the proofs are a speed upper bound for trees from [7] and that the number of
nodes within distance m from a given node is O(m3cm log n). Both of these
are true (and even simpler) for bounded-degree graphs. The remainder of the
proofs immediately carries over to this class. For simplicity, and because the
randomness of the Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs presents some further complications,
we state everything in terms of the Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs.
Lemma 3.3.5. Let G(n) denote the connected component of a realization of
a G(n, p) graph, and let the sequence t(n) denote increasing time instances,
scaling (without bound) with n. As above, let S
(n)
rep denote the random subset of
nodes reached by the epidemic, that also report. Then there exists a constant
C6 such that
RadiusBall(G(n), Srep) < C6t
(n),
with probability converging to 1 as n→∞.
Proof. Since the dependence on n is clear, we drop the index of n. This
theorem essentially states that there is a maximum speed at which the infection
can travel on an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph. The statement follows from a similar
maximum speed result for trees [7]. Therefore, it remains to show how this
result can be applied to an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph. To do this, we upper bound
an infection on an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph by a tree that represents the routes on
which an infection can travel. Since an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph is locally tree-like
[18], we expect this approximation to be fairly accurate for low times, though
this is not necessary for the proof.
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Consider the tree G˜ formed as follows. The root of the tree is the
initial infected node. The next level contains copies of all nodes adjacent to
the original node in the Erdo¨s-Renyi graph. Each of these have descendants
that are copies of their neighbors, and so on. Note all nodes may (and likely
do) have multiple copies.
We start an infection at the root of G˜ and let it spread for time t.
Consider the induced set of infected nodes, S˜rep, as the set of nodes in G
which have copies that are infected on G˜. Since the distance of a copy from
the root of G˜ is no less than the distance from the original node to the original
infection source, we see that the distance the infection has traveled on G˜ is no
less than the distance from the infection source to the farthest node in S˜rep
(on G). Note that the S˜rep stochastically dominates the true infected set S.
That is, for all sets T , P (T ⊂ S˜rep) ≥ P (T ⊂ Srep).
This stochastic dominance result follows from the fact that the transi-
tion rates are universally equal or higher for the induced set. Hence, we con-
clude RadiusBall(G,Srep) is also stochastically dominated by RadiusBall(G, S˜rep),
and the latter is upper bounded by the depth of the infection in the tree, which
using the speed result, is bounded by C6t for some speed C6. That is, with
probability tending to 1,
RadiusBall(G,Srep) < C6t.
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Next, we use the neighborhood sizes on this graph to provide a lower
bound to the ball size needed to cover a random infection.
Lemma 3.3.6. Let G(n) = G(n, p), and let S(n) denote a collection nodes
sampled uniformly at random from G(n), such that
∣∣S(n)∣∣ scales at least with
log n. Then
RadiusBall(G(n), S(n)) >
log n
3 log c
,
with probability converging to 1 as n→∞.
Proof. We suppress the index n for clarity. We proceed by bounding the
probability that all the random nodes are within a ball of radius m. This is
possible only if all nodes in S are within distance 2m from any given node in S.
Now, the number of nodes within a distance 2m from a given node is no more
than 16m3c2m log n with probability 1 − o(n−1) [11]. Then the probability of
all nodes fitting inside one such ball is at most(
16m3c2m log n
n
)|S|−1
<
(
16m3c2m log n
n
)logn−1
.
Then this decays to 0 at least as fast as n−1 if
16m3c2m log n
n
< n−1/ logn.
Finally we set m = logn
3 log c
as desired. Hence c2m = n2/3. Using this substitution,
the above term reduces to
16m3c2m log n
n
=
16m3n2/3 log n
n
=
16(log n)4
27(log c)3n1/3
< (log n)4n−1/3 < n−1/ logn (3.2)
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for sufficiently large n. Therefore, RadiusBall(G,S) > logn
3 log c
with probability
converging to 1.
The diameter of the giant component of an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph is Θ(log n)
[18]. Thus, Lemmas 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 establish that an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph sat-
isfies both the speed and spread conditions respectively.
3.4 Simulations
We simulated the performance of the Comparative Ball Algorithm to
evaluate the performance empirically. We determined the error rate over a
range of t for several pairs of graphs. We evaluated the two different standard
graph topologies considered earlier, grids and Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs.
We simulated the infections on various pairs of the graphs over a range
of times. In order to portray the results in a comparable way, we plotted the
error rate versus the average infection size instead of time. This is necessary
because different times result in very different infection sizes for the different
graphs. That is, the infection is large even at low t on an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph,
and vice versa for a grid graph. This would introduce a misleading effect in
the results.
Each node in the graphs received a random label to ensure indepen-
dence. We use n = 1, 600 for each graph with q = 0.25. For the Erdo¨s-Renyi
graphs, we use p = 2/1, 600. The probability of error was computed over
10, 000 trials. There are two possible types of errors in each simulation, when
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Figure 3.2: This figure shows the error probability for the algorithm on pairs of standard
graphs. Various (conditional) error probabilities are illustrated – ‘T:’ corresponds to the
true network, and ‘A:’ corresponds to the algorithm output.
the infection spreads on the first graph, and when it spreads on the second.
We label the error event ‘T:G1; A:G2’ for the error where the infection in fact
travels on graph G1 (True event), but the algorithm incorrectly labels it as
occurring on graph G2 (Algorithm output).
The results of these simulations are shown in Figure 3.2. Note that up
to about 5% of the network reporting an infection, the error rates are low in
all cases. The error rates are consistently low for the ‘T:Grid1;A:Grid2’ com-
parison up to the point where the whole network is infected. When comparing
a grid and an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph, there is a bias to label it an Erdo¨s-Renyi
graph at higher times, causing the ‘T:Grid;A:G(n,p)’ error to be very high
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and conversely, the ‘T:G(n,p);A:Grid’ error to be very low. This bias results
from the fact the diameter of the graph is not necessarily the optimum scaling
for the Comparative Ball Algorithm. Though (as shown in our theoretical
results) the two graphs can be still be distinguished at lower infection sizes,
using suboptimal scaling means that overall error probability will be high for
large infections, with a bias toward one of the graphs. This suggests that by
simply modifying the Comparative Ball Algorithm to normalize with respect
to a scaled graph diameter (where the scaling parameter would be graph de-
pendent), we could balance these two error probabilities, and thus result in
improved performance. To illustrate, by choosing a diameter scaling value of
1.6 for the Grid graph, the plot in Figure 3.3 indicates that one could distin-
guish between G(n,p) and Grid graphs for a significantly larger range.
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Figure 3.3: This figure shows the error probability for the G(n,p) vs. Grid graphs for the
scaled diameter setting (diameter of G(n,p) graph is scaled by 1.6).
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Chapter 4
False Positives
4.1 Introduction
Identifying the process causing an infection can be essential to reacting
appropriately, and it is challenging when the set of sick nodes is incomplete,
and especially inaccurate. In previous chapters, we demonstrated that by using
the clustering of the sick nodes, it is possible to distinguish between a random
sickness and an infection, and between two different infections. However, the
algorithms employed were very sensitive to outliers. A single false positive, a
node reporting sickness when it is not actually infected, can drastically change
how clustered the algorithms rate the sick nodes. In particular, when any node
at maximum distance from the infection source falsely reports sickness, then
the ball algorithm will conclude that the sick nodes are maximally spread.
That is, it will never be able to identify the infection.
However, real data is often inaccurate. For example, online records
(flu-related keywords in social networks [13], or Internet searches such as in
The work in this chapter appears in the following publication:
Chris Milling, Constantine Caramanis, Shie Mannor, and Sanjay Shakkottai. Detecting
epidemics using highly noisy data. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM International
Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, pages 177–186, 2013.
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Google Flu Trends [23]) provide large but noisy data sources for detecting flu
epidemics, but potentially containing many false positives. In evaluating the
spread of the flu, there may be many people reporting flu-like symptoms, but
have a different ailment. To be useful in in practical applications, the algorithm
must be modified to be robust. This requires filtering out false positives before
evaluating the clustering of the sick nodes. These false positives may occur in
two possible ways. In the easier case, the false positives are randomly spread
out over the network. In the second case, the false positives may be placed
arbitrarily, such as chosen by an adversary so that the problem is as difficult
as possible. For example, if the sick nodes were created by a random sickness,
the adversary may place the false positives in a cluster so that the sickness
appears closer to an infection.
We consider the task of distinguishing a random sickness from an in-
fection in the presence of false positives. After the infection proceeds for some
time, a fraction of the sick nodes report the sickness. Then, we add a num-
ber of false positives proportional to the number of reporting nodes. In other
terms, a fixed fraction of the complete set of reporting nodes are false posi-
tives. These false positives are either arranged randomly or are chosen by an
adversary. Under these conditions, the problem is to determine whether the
original sick nodes are due to a random sickness or infection.
We develop a robust algorithm based on the ball clustering to solve
these problems, called the Quantile Ball Algorithm. We prove that this algo-
rithm can distinguish the processes for a wide range of infection sizes in the
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presence of false positives. When the false positives are located randomly, the
algorithm succeeds with high probability when the fraction of reporting nodes
that are false positives is any value less than one, though the largest infection
that can be successfully detected decreases when there are larger numbers of
false positives. For adversarial placement of the false positives, we show that
the algorithm succeeds as long as the faction of nodes that are false positives
is less than one half. This is the best theoretically possible.
4.2 Problem Statement
The fundamental aspects of this problem are the same as in basic prob-
lem from Chapter 2. The random sickness versus infection problem is setup
as before. The infection spreads according to the SI model for time t. For
the random sickness, each node is randomly and independently infected with
probability q′. This probability is set so that the expected size of the random
sickness is the same as that of the infection. Each of the sick nodes reports
with a fixed probability q. See Section 2.2 for additional details. Next we
formally describe the necessary graph properties, as well as the false positives
and mixed infection.
4.2.1 Graph Conditions
We assume the graphs are sufficiently well behaved that it is possible to
distinguish an infection process. These conditions are similar to the conditions
for a graph to be detectable as described in Chapter 3, but slightly more
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detailed. These conditions guarantee that first, the infection spreads only up
to a fixed maximum speed, and second, that the random nodes are spread out.
However, we require somewhat more complex conditions for our results. The
conditions are labeled limited epidemic speed and limited neighborhood size.
Definition 4.2.1. A graph family G has limited epidemic speed if there exist
finite, positive constants sG, λG such that for sufficiently large n, a graph
G(n) chosen randomly from G(n) and an epidemic starting at any node a with
duration t(n), with S(n) defined as the set of nodes infected at time t(n),
P (RadiusBall(S(n)) > sGt
(n)) < e−λGt
(n)
.
The speed sG in the above definition is in fact an upper bound on the
speed, in that we require no matching lower bound. Nevertheless, we refer
to it as the speed for brevity. In addition, we also need a constraint on the
neighborhood size.
Definition 4.2.2. A graph family G has limited neighborhood size if, for graph
G(n) chosen randomly from G(n), diam(G(n)) scales as Ω(log n) and there exists
a increasing concave function b
(n)
G (x) such that for all 1 ≤ x, b(n)G (x) > 0 and
all balls on G(n) of radius no more than b
(n)
G (x) contains less than x nodes with
probability tending to 1.
These conditions hold for typical graph topologies such as grids and
Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs, as can be seen from the proofs for the results in Section
3.3.3. In fact, both of these previous conditions follow for any graph with
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a bounded degree distribution, as stated formally below. For these graphs,
the neighborhood size function does not vary with n. We note that there are
multiple choices for this function, but by using tighter functions (accounting
for the exact graph topology), the sufficient conditions given in our results are
improved.
Theorem 4.2.1. Let G be a graph family whose graphs have maximum degree
d¯. Then G has both limited epidemic speed and limited neighborhood size.
Proof. First, the spread of the epidemic on any graph G(n) from G can be upper
bounded by a tree of degree d¯ where nodes are repeated for each path to them.
See [47] for details on this bound. Then using a speed upper bound for trees,
we find that G has limited epidemic speed, where the exponential probability
of error follows from a Chernoff bound [7]. Next, using the maximum degree
condition, the number of nodes within distance r from an arbitrary node u
of any graph G(n) is at most d¯r+1. Therefore, for any x, 1 ≤ x, no ball
of radius logd¯ x − 1 contains more than x nodes. From this, we see that
diam(G(n)) ≥ logd¯ n − 1. Letting bG(x) = logd¯ x − 1, we see this satisfies the
desired condition for limited neighborhood size. This completes the proof.
We suppress the index (n) on the graph G and the infection parameters
when it is clear from context. Likewise, we omit the index (n) and subscript G
from sG, λG, and b
(n)
G (x) for clarity. When it is clear from context, we reference
the family G by a representative graph G from that family. That is, we say a G
has limited epidemic speed and limited neighborhood size if its family G does.
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We assume that the speed sG and spread function b
(n)
G (x) are known. Next,
the following simple lemma (using a balls-in-bins argument) proves useful in
the sequel, so we give it here.
Lemma 4.2.2. Consider graph G. Let 0 < x < 1 and δ > 0. Then there
exists  depending on δ with 0 <  < 1 such that the following is true. Let
S be a collection of nodes chosen uniformly at random with |S| = Ω(log n).
Let B be a collection of nodes with |B| < (1 − )xn. Then the probability
that B contains at least x fraction of the random nodes in S decays to 0 as n
increases. In particular,
P (|B ∩ S| ≥ x |S|) < e−δ|S|.
The main way we use this lemma is to show that the probability that
a large fraction of randomly selected nodes fall in a ball around a given node,
goes to zero.
4.2.2 False Positives
In this problem, we add false positives to the set of reporting sick nodes.
Then, only a fixed fraction of the reporting nodes available to the algorithm
reflect nodes that are actually sick. Define Srep to be the set of reporting sick
nodes. Let f be a fixed constant with 0 < f < 1, representing the relative
fraction of false positives compared to truly sick nodes. We will then add false
positives to get S¯rep, the set of both reporting sick nodes and false positives,
which is then made available to the algorithm. Set the number of false positives
74
to be f |Srep|. Note that the fraction of all the reporting nodes that are false
positives is f
1+f
.
The false positives are then added either randomly or by an adversary.
In the random setting, choose f |Srep| nodes uniformly over the entire graph.
If f |Srep| > n, then only n nodes are chosen, though distinguishing infections
is impossible at this point. We allow nodes that are already in Srep to be
chosen. Let Arep be these false positive nodes. Then S¯rep = Srep
⋃
Arep. Note
then that there may be less than f |Srep| false positives. However, this effect
will be small for small infections.
In the adversarial regime, the false positives are placed arbitrarily. In
particular, the adversary places the false positives in whatever way would
lead to the highest probability of error for our algorithm. Then, we require
the algorithm to be able to handle any arrangement of the false positives.
As before, defining Arep as the set of false positives, set the complete set of
reporting nodes S¯rep = Srep
⋃
Arep. We allow the adversary to choose repeats
as in the random arrangement case, though generally this makes the problem
easier.
4.2.3 Algorithm
To solve this problem, we use a modification of the Threshold Ball
Algorithm (from Section 2.3) called the Quantile Ball Algorithm. It is defined
in terms of a parameter α, with 0 < α ≤ 1. In this algorithm, we find the
smallest radius ball that contains a fraction α of the reporting nodes. That
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is, the algorithm is given the set of all reporting nodes S¯rep. Then it finds the
ball of minimum radius containing at least α
∣∣S¯rep∣∣ of the reporting nodes in
S¯rep. This lets the algorithm ignore the worst fraction of the reporting nodes.
The algorithm uses a threshold r on this infection size as the maximum radius
such a ball can have to be labeled an EPIDEMIC. However, it can reduce the
number of true infected nodes that are evaluated, which reduces the accuracy
of the algorithm. The algorithm is specified formally as follows.
Algorithm 5 Quantile Ball Algorithm
Input: Graph G; Set of reporting infected nodes Srep;
Parameters: Quantile α, Threshold m
Output: EPIDEMIC or RANDOM
c← α [|Srep|]
for all (u ∈ V do
B ← BallG(u,m)
if |B ∩ Srep| ≥ c then
return EPIDEMIC
end if
end for
return RANDOM
4.3 Main Results
We will establish several sufficient conditions for when the Quantile Ball
Algorithm can successfully determine the causative process of the infection. In
particular, we show that the probability of error decreases to 0 for reasonable
ranges of infection sizes for any value of f (the ratio of false positives to true
reporting nodes) if the false positives are arranged randomly. For adversarial
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false positives, it is possible for f < 1 (over half the reporting nodes are actually
sick). The first case we consider is when the nodes are located randomly.
4.3.1 Randomly Located
When the false positives are spread randomly through the graph, then
the behavior of a random sickness does not change: it is still an unclustered set
of sick nodes. That is, if we find any large set of clustered nodes, the sickness
is very likely to be an infection. By filtering out a sufficient number of false
positives, this case becomes roughly equivalent to the basic random sickness
vs. infection problem. Then we expect that this case is substantially easier
than the adversarial case. We show that is in fact the case, and that we can
distinguish a random sickness from an infection even with an arbitrarily high
faction of false positives.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let f > 0. Assume the number of reporting nodes is ω(log n).
Then there exists a constant C0 such that if the infection time satisfies t <
b
(
n
C0(1+f)
)
/s, using the Quantile Ball Algorithm, setting the parameters α =
1/(1 + f) and m = st, the infection type can be correctly distinguished with
probability approaching to 1.
Proof. The proof proceeds in a very similar way to Theorem 4.3.2. First
suppose the infection is an epidemic. We can cover all true reporting nodes
with probability scaling to 1 using the speed definition. Since at least an
α fraction of the reporting nodes are truly infected, our algorithm correctly
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reports the infection is an epidemic. Therefore the Type II error probability
decays to 0.
Now suppose the infection is a random sickness. Since the false positives
are also random, the reporting nodes with the false positives are simply are
larger set of random nodes. Define C0 as the same constant as in the proof of
Theorem 4.3.2. Assume m < b
(
n
C0(1+f)
)
. Using Lemma 4.2.2 in the same way
as previously, we see that no ball of radius m contains over a α = 1/(1 + f)
fraction of the random nodes with probability approaching 1. In this case,
our algorithm returns random sickness. Thus the Type I error probability also
tends to 0.
Roughly speaking, this means that for infection times less than an
upper bound order-wise the same as the time to infect a constant fraction of
the network, the Quantile Ball Algorithm successfully distinguishes a random
sickness from an infection with high probability and for any fraction of false
positives. This is possible by choosing α to eliminate the false positives.
4.3.2 Adversarial
Next, consider the adversarial regime, where false positives are placed
by an adversary seeking to maximize our probability of error. The Quantile
Ball Algorithm succeeds in this case as well.
Theorem 4.3.2. Suppose G is as described. Suppose further that f < 1
and set f ′ = (1 − f)/(1 + f) > 0. Suppose t scales such that the number
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of reporting nodes is Ω(log n). Then there exists a constant C0 such that if
t < b(f ′n/C0)/s, the Quantile Ball Algorithm with α = 1/(1 + f), and m = st
correctly determines the type of infection with probability tending to 1 with the
number of nodes, n.
Proof. First we show that the Type II error probability decays to 0. To this
end, suppose the infection is in fact an epidemic. Consider only the true
reporting nodes Srep, and recall S¯rep is the set of all reporting nodes, including
the false positives. Note that |Srep| ≥ α
∣∣S¯rep∣∣. By the definition of speed s,
the probability the epidemic spreads outside a ball of radius m = st decays to
0, so this ball covers Srep and hence at least α fraction of the reporting nodes.
Therefore it is correctly labeled an epidemic.
Now we show that the Type I error probability also decays to 0. We
need to show no ball of radius m can cover α = 1/(1+f) fraction of the nodes.
Since only f/(1 + f) of the nodes are false positives, the ball must contain at
least (1− f)/(1 + f) = f ′ > 0 true reporting nodes. Then it is sufficient that
the probability there exists a ball of radius m covering f ′ |Srep| true reporting
nodes (which are located randomly) decays to 0.
By assumption, for some constant C ′, |Srep| > C ′ log n for sufficiently
large graphs. Let δ = 3/C ′ and  > 0 as guaranteed by Lemma 4.2.2. Set
C0 = 1/(1 − ) and assume m < b(f ′n/C0). Therefore, no ball of radius m
contains over f ′n/C0 nodes. Consider one of the n balls of radius m (one ball
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for each possible center node), call it B. Then by Lemma 4.2.2,
P (|B ∩ Srep| ≥ f ′ |Srep|) < e−δ|Srep|.
Then for sufficiently large n, e−δ|Srep| = o(1/n2). Therefore, from a union
bound, there is some ball of radius m containing over f ′ fraction of the true
reporting nodes with probability at most o(1/n). Hence, no such ball covers α
fraction of the nodes in S¯rep with probability tending to 1 so the Type I error
probability goes to 0.
That is, for a similar bound on the infection duration as before, the
Quantile Ball Algorithm can succeed for any f < 1. This means that as long
as the true infected nodes are in the majority, it is possible to distinguish a
random sickness from an infection. With some thought, it is clear that this is
the best possible for any algorithm (in terms of size of f). If the number of
false positives were the same as (or more than) the number of true reporting
nodes, then it is possible for the adversary to completely imitate the incorrect
infection process. This fact is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.3. Suppose f = 1 and the random sickness is normalized so
that the infection size distribution is equal for both infection processes. Then
the probability of error for any algorithm is at least 0.5.
Proof. There is a simple adversarial algorithm that guarantees a probability of
error of 0.5. Recall the a priori probability for each infection process is equal.
When the infection is from an epidemic, the adversary chooses nodes randomly
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exactly as in the random sickness. When the infection is from a random
sickness, the adversary chooses nodes exactly as in an epidemic. Therefore, in
all cases, exactly half the nodes are due to an epidemic, and half are due to
a random sickness. Since the infection size is normalized, each collection of
infected nodes is equally likely to be an epidemic as a random sickness. Then
the probability of error for every set S¯rep is 0.5 (no matter the algorithm), and
hence the overall probability is 0.5.
4.4 Simulations
We evaluate the Quantile Ball Algorithm by the empirical error proba-
bility, the average error probability for both Type I and Type II errors, weight-
ing both equally. We used a grid graph with n = 4900, and infection time
t = 10. The reporting probability was fixed at q = 0.25. The infection was
simulated for 1000 trials for each infection processes (a random sickness and
an epidemic), running the Quantile Ball Algorithm for each set of reporting
nodes. The expected size of the random sickness was normalized to the em-
pirical average size of the epidemic. We set the ball size parameter m to the
optimal value as determined empirically. The probability of error is plotted
against the empirical expected fraction of infected nodes. That is, for each
set of parameters, we estimated the expected number of infected nodes from
the simulations, which was divided by n to determine the fraction infected.
This expected fraction of infected nodes conveys the size of the infection, and
hence the difficulty of the problem (since the task is more difficult the larger
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Figure 4.1: This figure shows the overall error probability, the sum of equally
weighted Type I and Type II error rates, for a grid graph. The false positives
were located randomly on the graph. The x-axis measures the expected frac-
tion of nodes truly infected. As in our results, α = 1/(1 + f). The ball radius
m was set to the optimal value empirically.
the infection is). Note that since q = 0.25, the expected fraction of reporting
nodes is approximately 0.25 times as large.
We present our simulation results on the probability of error for grid
graphs for a variety of false positive frequencies. As in our analytical setting,
the random sickness infection size was normalized to the same distribution as
the epidemic as determined empirically. The results are shown in Figure 4.1.
The error probability is very low up to a very large number of truly
infected nodes. It climbs fairly slowly as the number of false positives in-
creases. Even when two-thirds of the reporting nodes are false positives, the
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error probability is low even up to an expected 40% of the network infected.
Therefore our algorithm works very well in this setting.
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Chapter 5
Mixed Infections
5.1 Introduction
The study of epidemic spread over social, communication, and human
contact networks, be it a contagion of a human or computer virus, or a rumor,
opinion or trend, begins with two basic questions: do we indeed have a spread-
ing epidemic, and if so, what is the causative network spreading it? Numerous
famous examples from the history of epidemiology ([57, 12]) have illustrated
the importance and difficulty of determining the causative network. With
accurate data collected over time, for example, from high accuracy medical
diagnoses of a known illness, the causative network essentially reveals itself.
Yet such data are rarely available. More to the point, highly incomplete and
noisy data often are available. Indeed, the challenge arises in particular, when
time lapse data of “true” illness is not available, and when the data we do
have is highly noisy.
The key idea in this work, is that different spreading mechanisms have
The work in this chapter appears in the following publication:
Chris Milling, Constantine Caramanis, Shie Mannor, and Sanjay Shakkottai. Detecting
epidemics using highly noisy data. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM International
Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, pages 177–186, 2013.
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different statistical signatures, in terms of the subset of people infected. This is
certainly the case when the causative graphs are very different, and the subset
of nodes (people, machines, etc.) the epidemic has reached (“infected nodes”)
are completely and accurately revealed. As discussed, however, the data avail-
able are typically noisy. Moreover, the larger the fraction of the network the
contagion has reached, the more this “network signature” is washed out. This
paper explores these tradeoffs. We consider a broad class of graphs: graphs
with bounded degree. The degree controls the infection’s speed. We consider
the case most relevant in spread of rumors, technology and ideas: the super-
position of two spreading mechanisms. Indeed, in the age of mass advertising
and mass media, trends spread friend-to-friend, but also through television,
Internet ads, and similar advertising efforts that exhibit a “star-like” contagion
network [27].
We consider two such mixed processes. In each process, the infection
and random sicknesses occur at different rates, but the network is the same for
both. One mixed process however is more infectious than the other. That is, in
one process, the infection rate is much higher than the random sickness, and in
the other, the random sickness dominates. Note that this is a generalization of
the problem of distinguishing a random sickness from an infection. However,
now there will be outliers that makes the problem more challenging. We
provide sufficient conditions for determining which is the dominant effect, when
only a vanishing fraction of infected nodes report, and when no time-lapse data
are available.
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5.1.1 Related Work
Analyzing the spread of epidemics under the susceptible-infected (SI)
model [20] has been considered in depth for a variety of graphs and circum-
stances [4, 24]. Myers et al. consider a problem similar to the mixed infection
regime [50]. That is, nodes infect each other through the network as usual, but
in addition, nodes are become sick randomly as well. In their model, nodes
become ’exposed’ to information, and may decide become infected, exposing
their neighbors to the information, with a probability dependent on the num-
ber of times they were exposed. An external source exposes nodes randomly
at a time-varying rate, and nodes may expose their neighbors after they are
infected. Their goal is to estimate the external infection rate and other algo-
rithm parameters. To accomplish this, the full sequence of infected nodes and
the times they were infected is required. The difference between this result
and the proposed problem, beyond the model differences, is first, here only
a partial set of the infected nodes is known. This is a nontrivial restriction,
heavily impacting the algorithm used. On the other hand, our algorithm must
only distinguish between two distinct processes, as opposed to estimating the
random sickness rate. As in the case of estimating the graph structure (Sec-
tion 2.1.2), the key distinguishing factor of our work is the minimal amount
of information available to the algorithm.
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5.2 Problem Statement
We consider two infection processes spreading on the same graph G.
At a single instant in time, some portion of the infected nodes report being
infected, and we must use this information to evaluate which infection process
most likely caused the infection. We use the same reporting process as in
Chapter 2, where each sick node reports with probability q. In this case
however, instead having a pure random sickness and a pure epidemic, both
infection processes are a mixture of both a random sickness and an epidemic.
Equivalently, the processes are mixtures of an epidemic on a star graph and
an epidemic on a well-structured graph. We refer to these as mixed infections.
However, one process is dominated by the random sickness process and takes
the role of the random sickness. Phrasing this as a hypothesis testing problem,
our null hypothesis is that the mostly random infection process is the cause
of the infection. The alternative is that the other epidemic dominated mixed
infection is the causative process.
5.2.1 The Infection Process
Let G = (V,E) denote the graph along which the infection spreads.
As discussed above, in the case of an epidemic spreading node-to-node, G is a
structured graph (e.g., d-dimensional grid). The initial node of the infection
is selected uniformly at random. We let n = |V |, the size of the graph. The
diameter of the graph is denoted diam(G).
Given a graph G, the contagion spreads as follows. At time zero, an
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initial node is selected and called “infected.” For the structured graph case,
we assume this initial infected node is selected uniformly at random. For the
star graph, it is the external central node. The infection spreads from that
node to its neighbors, across the edges of the graph. The spreading occurs
according to a standard susceptible-infected (SI) model [20, 18, 34] for an
epidemic. The spreading rate is parameterized by a single number, or rate.
To make clear the distinction between the rate for a structured graph or for
a star graph, we use η to represent the rate of the structured graph, and γ/n
the rate of the star graph. We divide by n in the case of the star graph so that
new infections appear at rate γ (ignoring the shrinking number of susceptible
nodes). This means the following: for each infected node and for each edge
incident to that node, we start an exponential clock, i.e., a clock that expires
after an exponentially distributed length of time, of expectation 1/η, i.e., of
rate η for a structured graph, and n/γ, i.e., of rate γ/n, for the star graph.
The expiration of a clock indicates that the adjacent node becomes infected
(if it is not already infected) and new clocks are started for each edge from
this newly infected node. In this way, the infection spreads along the edges of
the graph in a node-to-node fashion.
The star graph infects nodes at rate γ/n, and then these infected nodes
infect their neighbors on the structured graph (e.g., the grid) at rate η. Thus,
in this superposed process, nodes become infected at random at some rate
γ, which we term ‘seeds’. The infection then spreads from these seeds as an
epidemic on graph G at the (different) rate η. With the combination of these
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processes, the infection will appear as multiple ‘balls’ of decreasing size. The
first infection will be much larger, followed by smaller balls and then (possibly)
individual infected nodes.
In this setting, we consider two different processes: one where the dom-
inant factor is the random infection (the spread from the star graph) and the
other where it is the spread along the structured graph that dominates. Thus,
in the first setting we have γ  η, and the random infection dominates the
epidemic, and in the second setting, η  γ, and the epidemic spread domi-
nates the infection process. We define S as the set of infected nodes at a given
time t, and let Srep be the set of reporting infected nodes.
5.2.2 Graphs
We consider on graphs G chosen from family G with constant bounded
degree. That is, suppose that for a constant d¯, every vertex in the graph has
degree no more than d¯ for each graph in that family. This condition suffices
to limit the speed at which the epidemic can spread through the network,
and otherwise makes the epidemic well behaved. In particular, from Theorem
4.2.1, the graph has limited epidemic speed and limited neighborhood size. See
Section 4.2.1 for details on these conditions. We restate these conditions for
the reader’s convenience.
Definition 5.2.1. A graph has limited epidemic speed if there exist finite,
positive constants s, λ1 such that for sufficiently large n and time t, and an
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epidemic starting at any node a,
P (v(a, t) > st) < e−λ1t.
Definition 5.2.2. A graph G has limited neighborhood size if diam(G) scales
as Ω(log n) and there exists a increasing concave function b(x) such that for
all b(x) > 0 and all balls of radius no more than b(x) contain less than x nodes
for sufficiently large n with probability tending to 1.
5.2.3 Algorithm
We use an extension of the Quantile Ball Algorithm from Section 4.2.3.
Like in that algorithm, we use a parameter α satisfying 0 < α ≤ 1, and only
look at the α fraction most clustered nodes. However, in this case, we also use
β balls to contain the infected nodes, with β ≥ 1, since there may be multiple
clusters from the epidemic.
We term our algorithm the Multiple Ball Algorithm. The Multiple Ball
Algorithm is simple to describe: it searches for the smallest ball/collection of
balls that covers a minimum fraction of the reporting infected nodes. Of
course, it has no way to tell if a reporting sick node is truly infected or a
false positive, and as emphasized above, this is not the goal of this paper. If
the resulting radius of this ball is small enough, it declares that there is an
epidemic; otherwise, it concludes that the infection process is in fact a random
illness. This algorithm is efficient, as even the brute-force implementation
runs in time at most O(|V |2 · |E|) when there is a single ball, and in general,
order-wise polynomial in |V | · |E|.
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The algorithm takes three parameters α, β and m. These parameters
are tailored to the problem at hand, including, in the case of m, the size of
the graph. As input, it takes a graph G and a set of reporting infected nodes
Srep. If the algorithm can cover an α-fraction of the infected nodes with β
balls, each of radius at most m, it declares the infection to be an epidemic;
otherwise, it labels the infection a random illness. In most cases, it is sufficient
to use a single ball (that is, β = 1).
Algorithm 6 Multiple Ball Algorithm
Input: Graph G; Set of reporting infected nodes Srep;
Parameters: Quantile α, Number of Balls β, Threshold m
Output: EPIDEMIC or RANDOM
c← α [|Srep|]
for all (u1, u2, . . . , uβ) ∈ V K do
B ← ⋃1≤i≤β BallG(ui, r)
if |B ∩ Srep| ≥ c then
return EPIDEMIC
end if
end for
return RANDOM
In the basic Multiple Ball Algorithm, we considered the case when all
balls have the same radius. However, in many cases, when multiple balls are
used, it makes sense to have some balls smaller than others. For example,
the epidemic won’t spread as far from a node that became randomly sick
late into the infection, compared to the node that initially sick. To account
for this, we also consider a modification of the previous algorithm called the
Scaling Multiple Ball Algorithm. In this algorithm, the radius of the balls
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scales linearly up to the radius of the largest ball, m. When there is only one
ball (β = 1), this algorithm is identical to the previous one.
Algorithm 7 Scaling Multiple Ball Algorithm
Input: Graph G; Set of reporting infected nodes Srep;
Parameters: Quantile α, Number of Balls β, Threshold m
Output: EPIDEMIC or RANDOM
c← α [|Srep|]
for all (u1, u2, . . . , uβ) ∈ V K do
B ← ⋃1≤i≤β BallG(ui, ri/β)
if |B ∩ Srep| ≥ c then
return EPIDEMIC
end if
end for
return RANDOM
Both forms of the Multiple Ball Algorithm take computation time ex-
ponential in β. This time can be substantially reduced by modifying the
algorithms to be greedy. More precisely, instead of optimizing over all possible
collections of balls, the greedy algorithm first tries to cover as many report-
ing nodes as possible with the largest ball. Then, it covers as many of the
remaining reporting nodes as possible with the next largest ball, and so on.
The resulting algorithm is much more efficient when there are a large number
of balls, but may return an incorrect result. We analyze only the exact forms
of the Multiple Ball Algorithm unless otherwise stated.
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5.3 Main Results
Mixed processes, with both an infection component and random sick-
ness component, can be distinguished in a similar way as in the case of false
positives from Chapter 4. This is because, if the infection component domi-
nates, the initial infection will be much larger than the others, so the secondary
infections can be treated as outliers. Likewise, if the random component dom-
inates, the infections from the many random seeds will be spread over the
graph, so no small ball can contain many of the infected nodes.
We consider two distinct infection processes. In Process 0, the infection
spreads mostly randomly. Let γ0, η0 be the infection rates for the random
sickness and epidemic respectively and t0 be the infection time for Process 0.
For clarity, we also call Process 0 “Process SR-WE” (Strong random, weak
epidemic). In Process 1, the infection is dominated by the epidemic, and let
γ1, η1, and t1 be the corresponding parameters as before. We label Process 1
“Process WR-SE” (Weak random, strong epidemic). Note that the infection
is the same if the rates are scaled up by the same factor that time is scaled
down. Then we can say that the epidemic dominates in Process 1 relative
to Process 0 if η1/γ1  η0/γ0. Unlike in the previous chapters, we apply no
explicit normalization. Rather, we provide sufficient conditions on the range
of the parameters for which the Multiple Ball Algorithm succeeds.
Theorem 5.3.1. Consider an infection spreading as in Process 0. Suppose
qγ0t0 = ω(log n). Suppose there exists a constant integer C3 ≥ 1 where η0t0 =
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o
(
(γ0t0)
−1/(1+C3)) and for some  > 0, suppose that m+C3 < b( αnβd¯C3+1(1+)).
Then the Type I error probability for both the Multiple Ball Algorithm and
Scaling Multiple Ball Algorithm decays to 0 as n increases.
Proof outline. The conditions in the theorem are sufficient to show that the
epidemic will not spread more than a constant distance from any seed. Due to
this, it is sufficient to show that an α fraction of the seeds cannot be contained
by the balls. Standard bounds on the spread of a random sickness is sufficient
to complete the proof. See the appendix for the details of the proof.
Next consider the infection spreading by Process WR-SE [Process 1].
Then we can characterize the range for which the Type II error goes to 0 as
follows.
Theorem 5.3.2. Consider an infection from Process 1. Suppose m > sη1t1,
where s is the speed of the infection when it spreads at rate 1, β is a constant,
and η1t1 scales to infinity. Suppose α = o(β(1 + γ1t1)
−1), and log(β/α) =
o(η1t1). Then for both forms of the Multiple Ball Algorithm, the Type II error
probability tends to 0.
Proof outline. Using the assumptions, we show that additional seeds are un-
likely. In fact, β/α is larger than the number of seeds. Therefore, the largest
β epidemics contain at least an α fraction of the infected nodes. Using the
speed bound, the threshold is sufficiently large enough to contain each epi-
demic. Therefore, the Multiple Ball Algorithm succeeds. A similar approach
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works for the Scaling Multiple Ball Algorithm. The proof details are in the
appendix.
Finally, recall we can choose the algorithm parameters α, β and m.
Then the question is, when can we choose appropriate algorithm parameters
so that the probability of error goes to 0? This is answered by the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.3.3. Suppose there exists C3 such that η0t0 = o
(
(γ0t0)
−1/(C3+1))
and qγ0t = ω(log n). Suppose η1t1 = ω(log(γ1t1)), γ1t1 = ω(1), and sη1t1 =
o
(
b( n
γ1t1
)
)
. Then the algorithm parameters can be chosen so that the proba-
bility of error for the Multiple Ball Algorithm approaches to 0.
Proof. We must choose m, α and β so that sη1t1 < m < b
(
αn
C4β(1+)
)
− C3
and α = o(β(γ1t1)
−1), log(β/α) = o(η1t1), where C4 = d¯C3+1. We set β = 1,
though note that we can use β > 1 by inversely scaling α with β. First we
consider the conditions on α. Define an arbitrary slowly increasing function
g(n) = θ(1), g(n) = o(γ1t1). This is possible since η1t1 = ω(1). Choose
α = (γ1t1g(n))
−1. Then we have
log(1/α) = log(γ1t1g(n))
< 2 log(γ1t1)
= o(η1t1).
Thus α satisfies the desired conditions. Now we show it is possible to choose
an appropriate m. By hypothesis, sη1t1 = o(b(
n
γ1t1
)). From our choice of α,
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for sufficiently large n, α
C4(1+)
< 1
γ1t1
. Using the concavity of b(x),
b
(
n
γ1t1
)
<
γ1t1
α/(C4(1 + ))
b
(
αn
C4(1 + )
)
= o
(
b
(
αn
C4(1 + )
))
. (5.1)
Therefore, sη1t1 = o(b(
αn
C4(1+)
)), with sη1t1 = ω(1) by hypothesis. Thus it
is clear m can be chosen with sη1t1 < m < b
(
αn
C4(1+)
)
− C3, for example by
averaging each side. With this choice of parameters, the conditions of Theorem
5.3.1 and Theorem 5.3.2 are satisfied. Hence, both the Type I and Type II
error probabilities tend to 0.
The above conditions are fairly opaque however. These conditions can
be described roughly as follows:
• The total number of nodes that can be covered by a β balls of radius 2m
(where m increases with n) must scale a constant factor less than the
total number of nodes times α.
• In Process SR-WE [Process 0], the expected number of reporting seeds
must be order-wise more than log n.
• In Process SR-WE, the infection spreads no more than a constant dis-
tance.
• For Process WR-SE [Process 1], the thresholdmmust be set large enough
that a ball of radius m covers the largest infection (using the epidemic
speed).
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• For Process WR-SE, the expected number of seeds must be order-wise
less than βα−1.
• For Process WR-SE, βα−1 must be order-wise less than exponentials in
η1t1.
One interesting observation is that even when there are multiple clus-
ters, it is still possible to use only a single ball in our algorithm, as long as α
is reduced appropriately. This fact is borne out in our simulations.
5.4 Simulations
To support our analytic results, we performed a variety of simulations
of the performance of our algorithms. Each of our simulations was performed
on a grid with n = 4900, and with the opposing edges connected to form a
torus. We use an infection time of t = 10 (unless otherwise stated) and a
reporting probability of q = 0.25. The average probability of our algorithm
was determined over 10000 trials, where each infection process was equally
likely to be the causative infection.
To normalize the infection sizes, we adjusted the rates so that the in-
fection sizes for both infection processes would be similar. This was done by
first choosing the epidemic rate for each process, and then empirically finding
the random rate to three significant digits so that expected number of infected
nodes hit a target value, typically with a specified fraction of the network being
infected. This was done so that all the infections (for the various parameters)
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would be fairly comparable. Process SR-WE [Process 0] used an epidemic rate
of 0.2, and we varied the epidemic rate for Process WR-SE [Process 1].
Figure 5.1 shows the probability of error using the Multiple Ball Algo-
rithm with a single ball (β = 1) for various infection sizes. The infection rate
for Process WR-SE [Process 1] is given on the x-axis. As expected, the larger
the infection, the more difficult it is to use clustering to determine whether an
infection is mostly random or mostly an epidemic. When an expected 60% of
the nodes in the network are infected, then the probability of error stays high,
even for much larger infection rates. Note that there is a maximum infec-
tion rate before the target infection size is exceeded regardless of the random
sickness rate. We used Process WR-SE infection rates close to that maximum.
Next we determine the effect of α on the probability of error. Again,
β = 1. These results are shown in Figure 5.2. Surprisingly, changing α has
a relatively small effect on the probability of error. The largest effect seen is
using too large a value for larger Process WR-SE infection rates (when the
probability of error is low). However, that is still relatively small. Then our
algorithm seems fairly insensitive to the value of α.
Finally, we use the Scaling Multiple Ball Algorithm with multiple balls,
implemented as a greedy algorithm. The probability of error is plotted in
Figure 5.3. This simulation used a larger grid graph with n = 10000 with 1000
trials. Process SR-WE [Process 0] had an infection rate of 0.1 and random
rate so that the expected infection size was 20% of the graph. We set the
parameter α = 1 for β = 1 and α = 0.75 otherwise, which was empirically the
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Figure 5.1: This figure shows a chart of the overall error probability for various
expected fraction infected against the Process WR-SE infection rates. The
Process SR-WE infection rate is 0.2. The parameter α = 0.5. The ball radius
m was set to the optimal value empirically.
optimum value of α for each β from several tested values. The x-axis shows
the infection rate for Process WR-SE [Process 1]. From the simulation, we
find using multiple balls achieves a reduction in error probability for β ≥ 5,
especially at lower infection rates of Process WR-SE, when the problem is
more difficult. However, this reduction does come at a cost of computation
time.
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Figure 5.2: This figure shows the overall error probability for multiple values
of α and Process WR-SE infection rates. The Process SR-WE infection rate
is 0.2 and the expected fraction infected was 40%. The parameter m was set
to the optimum value.
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Figure 5.3: This figure shows the error probability for the Scaling Multiple
Ball Algorithm for a range of β (ball count). The simulation used a grid
graph with n = 10000, 1000 trials, a Process SR-WE infection rate of 0.1 with
t = 10. The random sickness rate was set so the expected fraction infected
was 20%. The parameters α and m were set to the optimum value from a set
of predetermined values.
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Chapter 6
Unknown Edges
6.1 Introduction
Modern life is dominated by communicated across networks, from over
the Internet, phones, or through traditional contact networks. Virus, infor-
mation, and rumors travel on these networks as well, and identifying when
these infectious processes spread is valuable in many cases. Using data about
a subset of infected people/devices (attained using infection reports, polling,
etc.) and the associated network, it is possible to distinguish an infection
from simple random noise, modeled as a random sickness [46]. Though sparse
knowledge about infected users is often fairly straightforward to obtain, it may
be different to know the entire social network. We pose the question: if the
network on only known inexactly, is it still possible to determine when an
infection occurs?
For many online networks, the information on the entire social network
(formed by friends, followers, and equivalent relationship) is available. Yet
even in these cases, this network may not entirely represent the network over
which an infection spreads. For instance, there may be friends who do not
use that social networking service. In the case of the spread of information,
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communicating to these oﬄine friends causes the appearance of that informa-
tion ‘jumping’ across the network. In the worst case, the infection may spread
to someone at a far distance on the social network, causing the infection to
not appear clustered as expected. Algorithms to distinguish between random
sicknesses and epidemics must be robust against these jumps.
To solve this problem, we use the Multiple Ball Algorithm. We consider
this problem in both the cases of unknown short and unknown long edges. For
unknown short edges, the distances on the graph do not change substantially
by their removal. We demonstrate that our algorithm can tolerate an arbitrar-
ily large number of unknown short edges and still perform well. In the case
of long edges, which may substantially change the network topology, we show
that the algorithm succeeds when there are up to a constant number of these.
These analytic results are supported by simulations.
6.2 Model
We base our model on that presented in Chapter 2. Let G from graph
family G be the complete true social network on which an epidemic may spread
as a SI infection process. We are presented with a set of sick nodes. These are
either from a random sickness, or from the aforementioned epidemic. Only a
small fraction of these infected nodes report their infection, each with proba-
bility q. The sizes of each infection process are normalized to be equal.
We require constraints on G so that there is sufficient topological infor-
mation to distinguish the two processes. In particular, we require the graph to
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have limited epidemic speed and limited neighborhood size, as defined Section
4.2.1. As shown in Theorem 4.2.1, these conditions are satisfied by all bounded
degree graphs.
6.2.1 Missing Edges
In this case however, some edges in G are unknown. These unknown
edges may be chosen arbitrarily, or under constraints detailed in the following
sections. Define G¯ as the subgraph of G with these edges removed. That is,
G¯ is the known social network. Note equivalently we can start with G¯ and
add these unknown edges to form the social network G, which may be useful if
the known edges should have some structure. The algorithm has knowledge of
only the subgraph G¯ (and the associated speed and spread functions). With
only this limited knowledge, the task is to distinguish an epidemic spreading
on G from a random sickness.
We say a set of unknown edges E¯ is has maximum length ` if, for each
e = (u, v) ∈ E¯, distG¯(u, v) ≤ `. That is, removing the edges increases the
distance between any two previously connected edges to at most `.
6.3 Results
To solve this problem, we use the Multiple Ball Algorithm as given in
Section 5.2.3. In this algorithm, we attempt to contain an α fraction of the
infected nodes with β balls of radius m, where α, β, and m are algorithm
parameters.
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Figure 6.1: A grid with one long unknown edge, represented by the thick
arrow. The infected nodes are colored red. The infection appears to jump
across the graph when the long edge is not known.
We divide the problem into two cases. In the first case, all the unknown
edges are ‘short’. The known graph then closely resembles the true social
network, just with some errors. The epidemic will still result in a clustering
of reporting infected nodes, and therefore can still be identified. In fact, we
show that for reasonable infection sizes, we can tolerate an arbitrarily large
number of such missing edges. The second cases is when some edges are ‘long’.
These edges allow the epidemic to jump large distances, and may cause the
set of infected nodes to appear as many different clusters. Figure 6.1 shows
an example. We show our algorithm can tolerate a constant number of such
edges.
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6.3.1 Short Edges
Suppose the set of unknown edges has maximum length `, where `
is a constant. Because of this, the distance between any two nodes cannot
increase by more than a factor of `. Note that for all nodes u and radius r,
BallG(u, r/`) ⊆ BallG¯(u, r) ⊆ BallG(u, r). Due to this fact, the known graph
G¯ satisfies the spread constraint for bG¯(x)
4
= bG(x). In addition, if G¯ satisfies
the spread constraint for some function b˜G¯(x), the original graph G satisfies
that constraint with function b˜G(x)
4
= b˜G¯(x)/`. Likewise, since the epidemic
would travel slower on G¯, G¯ satisfies the speed constraint. In order to set
the threshold, we also require that the speed of the infection does not change
substantially. A large speed change is possible even with short edges if they
are in sufficient quantity. Formally, we suppose that for a known constant
κ ≥ 1, if speed condition applies to G¯ with speed s¯, it applies to G with speed
κs¯. If the speed of an epidemic on the original graph is known (for example,
from prior epidemics), then this condition is not necessary for the threshold
to be calculable.
Theorem 6.3.1. Suppose G is the true social network and satisfies the speed
and spread constraints. Let G¯ be the known subgraph of G with edges with
length at most c removed, and suppose it has speed s¯ and spread function
bG¯(x). Suppose t increases with n sufficiently that the number of reporting
nodes is Ω(log n), and that for some constant  > 0, t < bG¯(n/(1 + ))/(κsG¯`).
Under these conditions, the Multiple Ball Algorithm using m = κsG¯`t (and
α = 1, β = 1) identifies the type of infection correctly with probability tending
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to 1 with the number of nodes, n.
Proof. Suppose first the sickness was caused by an epidemic. Note that by
the speed condition on G, the infection can be contained with high probability
inside a ball of radius sGt (where the ball in on G), and sG ≤ κsG¯. Since
the distance between any two nodes can increase by a factor of at most `, the
infection is contained in a ball on G¯ with radius κsG¯`t. Therefore, the Type
II error probability decays to 0.
Now consider a random sickness. Any ball on G¯ with radius m can
contain no more nodes than the same ball (with the same center and radius)
on G since removing edges only increases the distance between nodes. By
hypothesis, m < b(n/(1 + )) for some . Hence from the spread condition,
each ball contains no more than a 1/(1 + ) fraction of the network with
high probability. From standard arguments as in our previous results, the
probability that a random set of at least log n nodes is entirely contained in
only a fraction of the network decays to 0 exponentially. From a union bound
over the n possible balls, we find that the Type I error probability also decays
to 0.
6.3.2 Long Edges
As before, let G be the correct graph and suppose it satisfies the speed
and spread constraints. A constant number, K, of these edges are unknown
by the algorithm. These unknown edges are chosen arbitrarily and may be
any length. Then G¯ is the subgraph of G known by the algorithm, differing
107
only by these K edges. Note that as in the case of short unknown edges, G¯
satisfies the speed and spread conditions.
To handle the possible multiple clusters, we use the Multiple Ball Al-
gorithm with β > 1. This algorithm can successfully determine whether the
causative process is an epidemic or not in this problem for a simple reason.
Since there are at most K jumps (across the K missing edges), there are at
most K + 1 separate infections. Therefore, the infection can be contained in
balls around each of these separate infections (for sufficiently small infections).
This intuition is proven in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3.2. Let G¯ is the known subgraph of G, that is, with the unknown
edges removed. Suppose that the number of unknown edges is at most K.
Define constants C1 = [3(K+ 2)]
−1/2 and C2 = C1α/(K+ 1). Suppose t scales
such that the number of reporting nodes is Ω(log n) and t < bG¯(C2n)/sG¯. Using
the Multiple Ball Algorithm with α be an constant, 0 < α ≤ 1, β = K+ 1, and
m = sG¯t, the infection type can be determined with probability tending to 1 as
the graph size increases.
Proof. First we show that the Type II error probability decays to 0 as n→∞.
To do this, we define a set of nodes a0, a1, . . . , aK as follows. Set a0 to the
initial infected node. The first time the infection traverses one of the unknown
edges, let a1 be newly infected node. Likewise, let a2 be the infected node
from the second time the infection traverses an unknown edge, and so on.
Since there are only K edges, and an infection can spread across an edge at
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most once, there are at most K such infected nodes from ‘jumps’, which we
call ‘seeds’. Any remaining undefined nodes are set arbitrarily. This is well
defined since two nodes cannot be infected at the same time almost surely.
Now consider the epidemic process where each of these seeds is infected
at time 0 and the infection spreads over G¯. Note that this behaves the same
as the original process except the ‘seeds‘ are infected at an earlier time. The
removal of the unknown edges does not reduce the spread of the infection
since the end points are already infected. Since the spread of the infection is
monotonic in time, the infection is only larger on this new process.
As mentioned, since removing edges can only reduce the speed of the
infection, we know G¯ satisfies the speed condition as well. Therefore, the
spread of the infection (ignoring missing edges) around node ai for any 0 ≤
i ≤ K is at most m = sG¯t with probability tending to 1. Hence by a union
bound, the entire set of infected nodes is contained by K+1 balls, one around
each seed of radius m, with probability tending to 1. The spread on this new
process is only larger, so the same property applies to the actual epidemic.
Therefore, the Multiple Ball Algorithm correctly labels it an epidemic with
probability tending to 1.
Now, consider the Type I error probability. From the spread condition
and since m < bG¯(C2n), each ball on G¯ can contain at most C2n nodes, and
hence, all collections contain less than βC2n = C1αn nodes. Consider any set
of such balls, and let B be the nodes their union contains. Recall Srep is the
set of reporting sick nodes (located randomly). From standard balls-in-bins
109
arguments as in Lemma 4.2.2,
Pr(|B ∩ Srep| ≥ α |Srep)| ≤ e
−|Srep|
3C21
≤ n−(1/C1)2/3
= n−(K+2)
using the fact that |B| ≤ C1αn and |Srep| ≥ log n. There are no more than nβ
such collections of balls. From a union bound over all collections B,
Pr(∃B : |B ∩ Srep| ≥ α |Srep|) ≤ nβ−(K+2)
= n−1.
Therefore, the probability that an α fraction of the sick nodes can be contained
by β balls of radius m, that is, the Type I error probability, decays to 0.
6.4 Simulation
For our simulations, we assumed there were a small number of un-
known, arbitrarily long edges. We started with a grid graph with n = 4900,
and added a fixed number, K, of edges. Each edge connected two nodes, both
chosen independently uniformly at random. Each of these additional edges
were unknown by the algorithm (so only the grid graph was known). The
reporting probability is q = 0.25. The Scaling Multiple Ball Algorithm was
applied to this problem with α = 1, β = K + 1, and the threshold m set to
the optimum value. This algorithm was implemented in the more efficient,
but inaccurate, greedy form as described in Section 5.2.3. We expect that the
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Figure 6.2: This figure shows the overall error probability for a grid graph
with K additional randomly located unknown edges. The empirical expected
fraction of nodes that are infected is shown on the x-axis. The parameters are
α = 1, β = K + 1, and m set optimally.
inaccuracies have no significant impact on the probability of error. The ran-
dom sickness was normalized to have the same expected size as the epidemic.
The overall probability of error was determined using 10000 trials, with equal
number of epidemics and random sicknesses. This error probability is plot-
ted against a range of expected infection sizes (as determined empirically) in
Figure 6.2.
In all cases, the error probability is low until most of the graph is
infected. Then, we see that empirically, the Scaling Quantile Ball Algorithm
performs well in the presence of unknown edges.
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Chapter 7
Weighted Graphs
7.1 Introduction
Detecting failures and infections spreading over a network requires be-
ing able to distinguish a phenomenon that is spreading from node to node
through a contact process, from a collection of random failures occurring by
chance, or perhaps driven by an external source or event. The importance of
correct diagnosis of a spreading phenomenon – i.e., understanding that that
there is indeed a spreading epidemic, and properly detecting the contact net-
work over which it spreads – has been well documented in the history of human
virus epidemiology and computer networks alike [12, 42, 57].
A key assumption in prior work is homogeneity of the spreading net-
work; that is, the epidemic is assumed to spread at a constant (probabilistic)
rate. In real world networks, both these key assumptions typically do not
hold. For starters, close relations transmit infection more readily than distant
connections. More troubling is the assumption that the contact network is
The work in this chapter is to appear in the following publication:
Chris Milling, Constantine Caramanis, Shie Mannor, and Sanjay Shakkottai. Local detec-
tion of infections in heterogeneous networks. In Proceedings of INFOCOM, IEEE, 2015.
(To appear).
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known. While some network connections may be known (e.g., nuclear fam-
ily), others can only be estimated and should be best modeled by probabilistic
connections of different strength, especially from publicly available data. For
example, publicly (or relatively easily) available data may include a list of
coworkers, but typically would not include statistics on pairwise daily inter-
action times among employees. While a model assuming a known uniform
weight among all coworkers equaling the edges among family members may
well be inaccurate, one that assigns weighted edges that capture whatever
partial knowledge may be available, can be significantly more accurate and
representative.
Any realistic modeling of real-world epidemics must, therefore, be able
to accommodate heterogeneous edges. This is precisely the topic of the present
paper. Given a snapshot of an epidemic on a non-homogeneous graph, our
objective is to correctly diagnose the existence of the epidemic, especially
when parts of the network are not known, and when the data themselves are
highly noisy, corrupted via high levels of false positives and false negatives.
7.2 Problem Statement
We use a similar model as in previous chapters. The infection is caused
either by a random sickness or an epidemic. At a single time t, each infected
node reports with probability q. We suppose that the infection processes are
normalized so the expected infection size is the same for both processes. Using
the set of reporting nodes and knowledge of the graph structure, we seek to
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determine whether the infection was caused by an epidemic or simply a random
sickness. The set S denotes the complete set of infected nodes at time t, and
Srep denotes the set of reporting nodes.
7.2.1 Weighted Infection Model
The variant we consider is when the graph for the infection is weighted.
Let G = (V,E) be the infection graph, with nodes V and edges E. For each
edge eij between nodes i and j, there is a weight wij > 0. The infection spreads
over this graph in a manner similar to a standard SI infection. Initially, a
single randomly chosen node is the infection source, say node i. For each
edge connected from this node to an adjacent susceptible node, say node j,
a clock is started with exponentially distributed duration with mean 1/wij.
When a clock expires, the susceptible node on that edge becomes infected
(if it is not already infected by a different source). When a node becomes
infected, clocks are started for each edge connected to that node in that same
way, with the expected duration of the clock determined by the edge weight.
The infection spreads between connected nodes in this way until time t has
passed. Therefore, the higher the weight is between two nodes, the faster the
infection will travel between them. At this time, the infected nodes report
independently with probability q. In this case, we constrain q = ω(1/ log n).
These weights can substantially change how the infection spreads across
the graph. Edges with very low weights can almost be ignored. The infection
will spread mostly on edges with higher weights. Then the effective topology
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of the graph may be closer to the topology due to the higher weight edges.
A challenge with weighted graphs is that it can be difficult to evaluate the
infection structure, such as determining the expected time to infect a particular
node, without excessive computation.
7.2.2 Graphs
For graph G and arbitrary nodes i and j, define len(i, j) as the length,
in hop count, between i and j. Similarly, define dist(i, j) as the minimum
weighted distance between i and j. Our algorithm considers “balls” on these
graphs to be all nodes within a certain distance (this distance is weighted)
from a central node. For graph G, node i and radius r, define Ball(G, i, r) =
{j ∈ V : dist(i, j) < r}.
We suppose the graphs satisfy two conditions, and call such graphs
acceptable graphs. These conditions are similar to the speed and spread condi-
tions of previous chapters, though we include lower bounds. As before, graphs
with bounded maximum degree satisfy these conditions. The bounded speed
condition states roughly that the infection spreads at a bounded speed.
Definition 7.2.1. Consider graph family G. This family satisfies the bounded
speed condition for minimum speed s(−) and maximum speed s(+) (both con-
stants) if, for infection time t increases with n without bound, for graph G,
infection S and infection source i,
P
(
Ball(G, i, s(−)t) ⊆ S ⊆ Ball(G, i, s(+)t)
)→ 1.
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That is, the infection spreads at least a distance s(−)t and at most a distance
s(+)t.
The bounded spread condition requires that the neighborhood sizes are
well behaved. The spreading functions may scale with n, but we are most
interested in graphs of bounded degree, in which case these functions vary
only with x. Most importantly, we want to constrain the neighborhood size
as the graph size increases.
Definition 7.2.2. A graph family G satisfies the bounded spread condition
with concave increasing spreading functions b(−)(x) and b(+)(x), 1 ≤ x if, for
graph G(n) drawn from this family, with probability tending to 1 the following
holds for each node i and number of nodes x < n:
∣∣Ball(G, i, b(−)(x))∣∣ < x < ∣∣Ball(G, i, b(+)(x))∣∣ .
7.2.3 Additional Constraints
In addition to the basic problem, we consider two additional variants.
First, there may be false positives, uninfected nodes that report a sickness
regardless. Second, there may be unknown edges of the graph. Though both
of these constraints have been considered previously, we now consider them in
the context of weighted graphs.
We use the same false positive model as in Chapter 4. The number
of false positives is set by fixing the ratio between the number of reporting
infected nodes and the number of false positives. For a constant f ≥ 0 and
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|Srep| truly reporting nodes, we set the number of false positives to be (approx-
imately) f |Srep|. For each of the bf |Srep|c false positives, we independently
choose a random node from the entire graph and that node reports an infec-
tion, where repeats are allowed.
The second constraint is the some edges of the graph are not known.
From this perspective, the infection may appear to ‘jump’ between two nodes.
We consider the same cases as in Chapter 6. We define the length of a missing
edge as follows. For a removed edge e connecting nodes i and j, we say the
length of e is distG¯(i, j), the weighted distance between i and j on the graph
with missing (unknown) edges. For a constant `, removed edges are considered
short if their length is at most `. Otherwise, they are called long edges.
7.2.4 Algorithm
Our approach to solving this problem involves characterizing the shape
of an infection. The distance between two nodes appears to be a good approx-
imation of how easily an epidemic can spread from one node to the other. The
shorter the (weighted) distance, the faster the infection spreads. However, this
ignores the topological considerations: the number of short paths also matters.
Nevertheless, we show that the distance measure is sufficient to approximate
the shape of an epidemic in this situation, and thereby distinguish an epidemic
from a random sickness.
The heterogeneity in edges fundamentally changes the way we need to
think about inference in this setting. From an algorithmic viewpoint, earlier
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work that addressed this kind of inference problem [46, 47, 48] did so by
essentially detecting the boundary of the infected region – in essence, they
compare the radius of a ball that ‘covers’ the reporting infected nodes to a
fixed threshold. We call this algorithm the Threshold Ball Algorithm. If the
radius is small, then they report that there is an epidemic. However such
a test is sub-optimal, both analytically as well as in simulations when the
network edges have heterogeneity. Analytically, this occurs because estimates
of the radius of a ball covering the infected nodes does not have sufficient
probabilistic concentration guarantees for our inference purposes. Intuitively,
this happens because with edge non-homogeneities, the ‘boundary’ of infection
can have large protuberances (think of ray-like objects flaring out of the ball-
like footprint of infected nodes). These can cause outer radius estimates to
be poor. However, taking a volume inside the infected region and estimating
infection densities turns out to be much more robust. See Figure 7.1 for an
example.
The Threshold Ball Algorithm performs especially poorly if it uses hop
count to measure the ball radius. For some graph topologies, such as a grid
with diagonal edges, it is possible that the outer ball around the epidemic
covers the entire graph, even when the epidemic is relatively small. Figure 7.2
shows an example of this phenomenon. In that example, the radius of the ball
necessary to surround the infection is equal to the radius of the entire graph,
even if the epidemic is fairly small. Therefore, the Threshold Ball Algorithm
cannot distinguish this epidemic from a random sickness in this case, even if
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Figure 7.1: A weighted grid with infected nodes colored red, where the in-
fection travels faster in the horizontal direction. Due to the weights, the ball
surrounding the infected nodes (blue) is excessively large compared to the
more robust internal ball (green).
all nodes report. However, the inner ball approach we use still succeeds.
Our algorithm is called the Ball Density Algorithm. The algorithm
takes parameters m and d. The algorithm searches through the graph, and
determines whether any ball of radius m has a density of reporting nodes at
least d. As before, a ball of radius m is defined as all nodes within some
distance m of some central node. If there is a ball with sufficient density, the
reporting nodes appear sufficiently clustered and the infection is labeled an
‘epidemic.’ Otherwise, it is labeled a ‘random sickness.’
The Ball Density Algorithm is similar to the scan statistic considered
by Arias-Castro et al. [1, 2]. In that work, each node v reports a standard
Gaussian Xv except for possibly in a cluster K ∈ Km, which report i.i.d.
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Figure 7.2: An epidemic on a weighted grid including diagonals with infected
nodes colored red. The infection travels faster in the horizontal direction,
denoted by the thicker lines. The Ball Density Algorithm will likely succeed
for this infection, but the Threshold Ball Algorithm will not.
Gaussians with positive mean µK . The scan statistic is defined as
max
K∈Km
1√|K|∑
v∈K
Xv.
If this statistic is above a threshold, then there is likely an anomalous cluster.
For our problem, this cluster would correspond to the epidemic. Unlike in
our case however, all possible clusters are known. Also, in [1], they set µK =
|K|−1/2 ΓK and analyze necessary and sufficient bounds on ΓK . That is, the
mean deviation of the nodes in that cluster (µK) may decay on the order of
the square root of number of nodes in that cluster. Because of this, it is better
to divide by
√|K| (as opposed to |K|) in the scan statistic. However, in our
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case, the reporting probability is always q regardless of the infection size, so
we must divide by the ball size to find the mean reporting rate (the density).
In addition, computing the scan statistic may be computationally intensive if
Km is large, even when restricted to an -net. The Ball Density Algorithm on
the other hand is always efficient.
Ideally, we want the density threshold d to be close to the expected
density in the infected set, q. However, q may not be known. In that case,
we can estimate the required density by comparing it to the density outside
the ball. If the infection density within the ball is sufficiently higher than the
density outside the ball, that ball is likely within an epidemic. Along these
lines, we use a modified form of the algorithm called the Relative Ball Density
Algorithm. In this algorithm, if the density within a ball of radius m exceeds
the density outside the ball by a factor of at least β > 1, we label the infection
an ‘epidemic.’
Algorithm 8 Ball Density Algorithm
Input: Graph G; Set of reporting infected nodes Srep;
Parameters: Density d, Radius m
Output: EPIDEMIC or RANDOM
for all i ∈ V do
if |Ball(G, i,m) ∩ Srep| / |Ball(G, i,m)| ≥ d then
return EPIDEMIC
end if
end for
return RANDOM
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Algorithm 9 Relative Ball Density Algorithm
Input: Graph G; Set of reporting infected nodes Srep;
Parameters: Relative Ratio β, Radius m
Output: EPIDEMIC or RANDOM
for all i ∈ V do
ExternalBall← V \ Ball(G, i,m)
d← β |ExternalBall ∩ Srep| / |ExternalBall|
if |Ball(G, i,m) ∩ Srep| / |Ball(G, i,m)| ≥ d then
return EPIDEMIC
end if
end for
return RANDOM
7.3 Results
We show that the Ball Density Algorithm can distinguish between a
random sickness and an epidemic on a weighted graph under the specified
conditions. In addition, we also show that this algorithm is reliable. The
algorithm still succeeds even if there are false positives or some edges of the
graph are not known.
7.3.1 Basic Problem
The fundamental case is when we have access to the entire graph G
and the reporting nodes Srep with no false positives. Later sections include the
case when there are false positives, and when some graph edges are unknown.
We demonstrate that the Ball Density Algorithm and Relative Ball Density
Algorithm can succeed in determining the type of infection with asymptotic
probability 1, and characterize the range of infection sizes for which this is
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possible.
Our results require the fact that the number of reporting nodes in a
set is highly clustered around its expectation. This follows from the following
well-known Chernoff bound:
Lemma 7.3.1. Suppose in a set U of nodes, each node reports an infection
independently with probability q. Let Urep be the set of reporting nodes inside
U . Then for any δ > 0,
P (|Urep| ≥ (1 + δ)q |U |) < exp(−δ2q |U | /3)
and
P (|Urep| ≤ (1− δ)q |U |) < exp(−δ2q |U | /2).
We begin by limiting the density of a random sickness and of an epi-
demic. We use the fact that, when all balls of a specified radius contain at
least log2 n nodes, every such ball has density close to its expectation. Roughly
speaking, the following two theorems provide the conditions for the Type I and
Type II error probabilities to tend to 0.
Theorem 7.3.2. Consider an acceptable graph G of size n with random sick-
ness Srep. Let  > 0 be a small constant. Consider ball radius m satisfying
b(+)(log
2 n) < m and density threshold d = (1− )q. If the expected number of
infected nodes is less than (1 − 2)n, the density of every ball of radius m is
less than d with probability tending to 1.
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Proof. Note that a ball of radius m contains at least log2 n nodes. By hy-
pothesis, the expected reporting node density over the entire network is less
than (1− 2)q. Therefore, for any collection of nodes, the expected density of
infected nodes in that region is less than (1−2)q. Let δ = (1−)/(1−2)−1.
From the Chernoff bound Lemma 7.3.1, for a set of nodes of size k, the proba-
bility the density of reporting nodes in the set is over (1+δ)(1−2)q = (1−)q
is less than exp(−δ2(1 − 2)qk/3). Hence, for k ≥ log2 n (that is, for balls of
radius m), and with q = ω(1/ log n), this probability decays to 0 faster than
1/n. Using a union bound over the n balls of radius m (one for each central
node), each with at least log2 n nodes by the condition on m, we find that all
of them contain density less than (1− )q with probability tending to 1.
Theorem 7.3.3. Consider an acceptable graph G of size n with reporting
infected set Srep from an epidemic. Let  > 0 be a small constant. For time
t > b(+)(log
2 n)/s(−), ball radius b(+)(log
2 n) < m < s(−)t and density threshold
d = (1−)q, the density of nodes within a ball of radius m around the infection
origin is at least d.
Proof. From the speed condition, with probability tending to 1, the infection
contains all nodes within distance s(−)t of the origin. In particular, it contains
the ball of radius m. The expected density in that ball is q (the reporting
probability). As in Theorem 7.3.2, since the ball size is at least log2 n, the
probability the density is less than (1−)q decays to 0 using Lemma 7.3.1.
Combining these two results gives the conditions for when the Ball Den-
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sity Algorithm succeeds. That is, the infection time must be large enough that
the ‘inner ball’ of the epidemic (that is, the largest ball completely contained
in the epidemic) includes at least log2 n nodes. Second, the expected infection
size must be no more than a constant factor less than n. By setting the den-
sity threshold closer to q, the factor can be improved, so that the algorithm
succeeds when nearly the entire network is infected.
Theorem 7.3.4. Suppose G is an acceptable graph with size n, and let  > 0
be a small constant. In addition, suppose that the expected number of infected
nodes is at most (1 − )n and t > b(+)(log2 n)/s(−). Using the Ball Density
Algorithm with parameters m satisfying b(+)(log
2 n) < m < s(−)t and density
d = (1− /2)q, the algorithm successfully distinguishes a random sickness and
an epidemic with probability tending to 1.
Proof. First, consider a random sickness. From Theorem 7.3.2, all balls of
radius m have density less than d with probability approaching 1. In this case,
the algorithm corrects label the infection a random sickness. Now consider an
epidemic. From Theorem 7.3.3, there is a ball of radius m contained in the
epidemic with density at least d with high probability. Again, the algorithm
successfully labels it an epidemic. Therefore, both the Type I and Type II
error probability tend to 0.
We require that the expected infection size is at most a small factor
less than the size of the network and spreads at least enough to contain log2 n
nodes. Since it is impossible to distinguish a random sickness from an epidemic
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when the entire network is infected, this is at least order-wise optimal in the
maximum infection size. However, to set the density parameter, we assume
that q is known. When it is unknown, we must instead use the Relative Ball
Density Algorithm, where the minimum density is set to be a factor of β
higher than the density in the rest of the network. The Relative Ball Density
Algorithm succeeds in a similar range of times as the previous algorithm.
Theorem 7.3.5. Let G be an acceptable graph of size n and  > 0 be a small
constant. Let β > 1. Suppose that the expected number of infected nodes is at
least log2 n, and that t < s−1(+)b(−)(n/(β + )). Apply the Relative Ball Density
Algorithm with radius m satisfying b(+)(log
2 n) < m < s(−)t and relative factor
β. Then the algorithm correctly identifies the type of infection with probability
approaching 1.
Proof. Suppose the infection is a random sickness. Let k = E[|Srep|]. Then
the expected density in any set of nodes is k/n. Let δ = β−1
β+1
, so β = 1+δ
1−δ .
Applying the same method as in Theorem 7.3.2, with probability tending to
1, for each ball, the density within the ball is less than (1 + δ)k/n and the
density outside the ball is at least (1−δ)k/n. Therefore, the ratio between the
two is less than β so the algorithm correctly identifies it is a random sickness.
Next, suppose the infection is an epidemic. Let δ = /(β + ). Using
Theorem 7.3.3, the infection contains an m radius ball with density at least
(1−δ)q. From Lemma 7.3.1, the density of the entire infected set is at most (1+
δ)q. From the speed condition, we know with high probability, the epidemic is
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within a ball of radius s(+)t, containing at most n/(β+) nodes by assumption.
No nodes outside that ball report an infection. Therefore, the external density
is at most (1 + δ)q/(β + ). After some calculation, we find the ratio of the
internal and external density (1 − δ)(β + )/(1 + δ) is at least β. Hence, the
algorithm identifies it as an epidemic with probability tending to 1.
We only prove the Relative Ball Density Algorithm succeeds for time
such that the maximum epidemic spread covers nearly up to the network size,
in contrast to the time when the expected epidemic size is nearly n for the orig-
inal algorithm. There may be a constant factor between these times, depend-
ing on the network topology. That is, the algorithm may only be order-wise
optimal in infection time, not infection size.
Note that the entire network is (likely) infected for t = s−1(−)b(+)(n). In
addition, from concavity, b(−)(n/(β + )) > 1/(β + )b(−)(n). From this, we
conclude the Relative Ball Density Algorithm is order-wise optimal in infection
time so long as for some constant C, for all x, b(+)(x) < Cb(−)(x). That is,
as long as the lower and upper bounds on neighborhood size are similar. For
example, this is true for grids and trees. In addition, for some graphs, such as
grids, being order-wise optimal in infection time is the same as being order-
wise optimal in infection size. However, for tree graphs, it means success is
only guaranteed for infection sizes up to nγ for some γ < 1. Nevertheless, we
do not need knowledge of the reporting rate for this algorithm.
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7.3.2 False Positives
For most data sources, the knowledge of the infected nodes is likely to be
unreliable. We already include the possibility that there are false negatives,
but there are also likely to be false positives, i.e., nodes that report being
infected when they are not.
Recall that the number of false positives is parameterized as a factor f
of the number of actual infected nodes. Thus, there are at most f |Srep| false
positives, and these are spread randomly over the network. We show that
our algorithms can tolerate an arbitrary number of randomly located false
positives, though the maximum solvable infection size is reduced.
Theorem 7.3.6. Consider an acceptable graph G of size n, and an infection
on the graph, with false positive ratio f . Let  be some small constant. Suppose
the infection time is such that t > b(+)(log
2 n)/s(−) and the expected infection
size is less than (1 − )n/(1 + f). Then the Ball Density Algorithm, with
parameters m in the range b(+)(log
2 n) < m < s(−)t and density d = (1−/2)q,
determines the type of infection with probability that tends asymptotically to 1.
Proof. First, note that adding false positives only increases the density of
nodes. Then clearly the Type II error probability decays to 0 as shown in
Theorem 7.3.4. The remaining case is when the infection is a random sickness.
As compared to the case without false positives, the density is increased by a
factor of up to (1 + f), for an expected density of q(1 + f)E[|S|]/n. As before,
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as long as d is greater than this quantity, the Type I error probability decays
to 0. By assumption, q(1 + f)E[|S|] < q(1− ) < d, so we are done.
The Relative Ball Density Algorithm can also succeed in this setting.
Again, it can tolerate an arbitrary number of false positives, as long as the
infection size is sufficiently low. The maximum infection time is order-wise the
same as that in the case without false positives, and hence is also order-wise
optimal with balanced neighborhood size bounds.
Theorem 7.3.7. Suppose G is a size n acceptable graph. Let  > 0 be a small
constant, and let β > 1. Assume that the infection time t satisfies
b(+)(log
2 n)/s(−) < t < s−1(+)b(−)
(
n
(1 + f)(β + )
)
.
By using the Relative Ball Density Algorithm with radius m satisfying the
inequality b(+)(log
2 n) < m < s(−)t and with relative factor β, the type of
infection can be determined with probability approaching 1.
Proof. For this theorem, the random sickness case is the easiest. The composi-
tion of false positives and the random sickness is similar to a random sickness
with higher reporting rate. Just as in Theorem 7.3.5, the density inside and
outside any ball is close to its expectation (and equal for both regions) and
hence the Type I error probability tends to 0.
Now consider an epidemic on G. From the lower bound on t, the
expected infection size is at least log2 n. Using the upper bound on t as in
Theorem 7.3.5, the density of true reporting nodes over the network is at most
129
q(1 + f)−1(β + )−1. Since the false positives increase this expected density
by at most a factor of (1 + f), the outer density is at most q/(β + ). As
before, the expected density of the ball contained in the infection is q, plus
additional density from the false positives. Hence, as desired, the ratio between
the densities is at least β with probability tending to 1.
7.3.3 Unknown Edges
Another source of error is incomplete knowledge of graph structure.
Complete knowledge of contact networks may be difficult to determine, and
there may be unknown edges. Nevertheless, if these unknown edges are not
too numerous, then it is still possible to distinguish epidemics and random
sicknesses. We consider two types of missing edges. There may be a large
number of missing edges, but they are ‘short.’ On the other hand, there may
be a few missing ‘long’ edges.
First we consider the case where there are many short edges. That is,
suppose that for some constant `, each missing edge eij satisfies distG¯(i, j) ≤ `
as in Section 6.3.1. As before, using this property, we find that the distance
between any two nodes i and j on G¯ increases by a factor of at most ` over the
distance on G, since the length of each edge on the shortest path connecting
the two nodes increases by at most that factor. Additionally, removing edges
only lengthens the distance between nodes, never decreases it. By accounting
for the possible increase in distance, we again show that the Ball Density
Algorithm can distinguish the infection types.
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Theorem 7.3.8. Let G be an acceptable graph with size n. Suppose the only
unknown edges on G are short edges with length at most `. Let  > 0. As-
sume that the expected number of infected nodes is at most (1 − )n and
t > b(+)(log
2 n)/(`s(−)). For the Ball Density Algorithm, use parameters radius
m and density d with `b(+)(log
2 n) < m < s(−)t and density d = (1 − /2)q.
Then this algorithm correctly determines whether the infection is a random
sickness or an epidemic with probability approaching 1.
Proof. As compared to Theorem 7.3.4, the lower bound on m is scaled up by
a factor of `. The ball on G¯ of radius m must contain at least log2 n nodes,
because it contains the ball on G of radius m/`, which by assumption contains
at least log2 n nodes. Hence, from Theorem 7.3.2, the density of a random
sickness on all of these balls is no more than (1 − /2)q, an upper bound on
the overall density. Therefore, the Type I error probability goes to 0.
In addition, the ball of radius m on G¯ is contained in the ball of radius
m on G, since distances only increase. Therefore, in an epidemic, this ball is
contained within the infected set and has density greater then (1 − /2)q by
Theorem 7.3.3. From this, the Type II error probability also vanishes.
From Theorem 7.3.8, we see that by simply increasing the minimum
ball size to ensure we cover a sufficient portion of the network even with
edges missing, the Ball Density Algorithm succeeds as before. Therefore, we
conclude it is very tolerant of missing short edges. A similar result holds for
the Relative Ball Density Algorithm.
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Theorem 7.3.9. Consider an acceptable graph G of size n, and let  > 0 be a
small constant. Set β > 1. In an infection, suppose that the number of infected
nodes is at least log2 n, and that t < s−1(+)b(−)(n/(β + )). Using the Relative
Ball Density Algorithm with radius m in the range `b(+)(log
2 n) < m < s(−)t
and relative factor β, the infection type is correctly determined with probability
tending to 1.
Proof. Just as in Theorem 7.3.8, a ball of radius m on G¯ contains at least
log2 n nodes. In addition, such a ball around the source of an epidemic is
contained within the epidemic with high probability as m < s(−)t. These are
the conditions necessary for the error probability to decay to 0 as shown in
Theorem 7.3.5.
Now consider the case when there are few, but arbitrary length un-
known edges. Since these edges are not known, the infection appears to jump
across the graph when it traverses on one of these edges. Then suppose there
is a bound on the number of these edges, K. Therefore, there are at most K
jumps (with at most one per edge), and at most K + 1 clustered epidemics on
G¯. However, each of these clusters has a high density, and the algorithm still
succeeds with a slight modification. Namely, we only consider balls containing
at least log2 n nodes in the algorithm. If there are no such balls at that radius,
the infection is labeled a random sickness, though this case will not occur with
the radius specified.
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Theorem 7.3.10. Let G be an acceptable graph with size n, and suppose all
but K edges are known. Let  > 0 be a small constant. Consider an infection
with expected size at most (1− )n and duration t > 2b(+)((K+1) log2 n)/s(−).
Apply the Ball Density Algorithm, setting the parameters m so that b(+)((K +
1) log2 n) < m < s(−)t/2 and density d = (1 − /2)q, with the additional
requirement that the number of nodes within any considered ball must be at
least log2 n. Then a random sickness and an epidemic can be distinguished
with probability approaching 1.
Proof. From our additional condition, we know the balls contain log2 n nodes.
As in previous theorems, we know from Theorem 7.3.2 that the random sick-
ness density is less than d and the Type I error probability goes to 0. Next
consider an epidemic. We know the ball on G¯ is contained within the ball
on G of the same radius. Split the infection into two phases, each of length
t/2. From the speed condition, for each node within distance s(−)t/2 from
the infection origin, the ball of radius less than s(−)t/2 around that node is
contained in the infection. Applying Theorem 7.3.3, we see that, if any such
ball has at least log2 n nodes, it has the required density.
The main fact to be proved is that there is such a ball of radius m on
G¯ containing at least log2 n nodes. The ball of this radius on G contains at
least (K + 1) log2 n nodes by hypothesis. This ball can be split into ‘clusters’,
where a cluster is a ball around the node on the far side of one of the unknown
edges. There are at most (K + 1) of these clusters, and therefore, at least
one of them has log2 n nodes. Then, the ball of radius m around the center
133
of that cluster both is contained in the infection, and contains log2 n nodes as
desired.
The range of infection sizes for which we succeed is very similar to case
without missing edges. The radius used in the algorithm has a tighter range,
and the minimum infection time is larger. Note that the number of missing
edges K we can tolerate must satisfy (at least) K < n/ log2 n. The Relative
Ball Density Algorithm behaves in a similar way.
Theorem 7.3.11. Suppose G is an acceptable graph of size n, with at most K
unknown edges. Let  > 0 and β > 1. Assume that the expected number of in-
fected nodes is at least log2 n and t < s−1(+)b(−)(n/(β+)). Use the Relative Ball
Density Algorithm with radius m in range b(+)((K + 1) log
2 n) < m < s(−)t/2
and relative factor β, with the additional requirement that we consider only
balls containing at least log2 n nodes. This algorithm accurately distinguishes
whether the infection is a random sickness or an epidemic with probability
going to 1.
Proof. From the additional algorithm condition, the ball contains at least
log2 n nodes, so in the same way as Theorem 7.3.5, we see that the Type
I error probability goes to 0. For the epidemic, using the result from Theo-
rem 7.3.10, we know there is a ball contained within the infection of radius m
on G¯ with at least log2 n nodes. This ball satisfies the necessary conditions
for the same approach as in Theorem 7.3.5 to work. Then the Type II error
probability tends to 0.
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7.4 Simulations
We now provide simulation results that confirm our analytic results. In
addition, these simulations provide additional insight into how the probability
of error changes with variations in the parameters. First, we compare the
performance of the Ball Density Algorithm and the relative version with other
algorithms. In the next section, we illustrate the effect that changing the
weights of the graph has on the probability of error. Finally, we show the
probability of error for various numbers of missing edges.
For these simulations, we consider a grid graph where all the horizontal
edges have one weight, and the vertical edges have another. Note that structure
is desired in these weights. If the weights were simply random, then the
infection behavior would be nearly the same as an unweighted infection with
a modified edge traversal time distribution. We use graph size n = 4900. The
reporting probability is q = 0.25, and no false positives or missing edges are
used unless specified. The ball radius parameter is set to be the optimum value
as determined empirically. For the Ball Density Algorithm, we set the density
threshold to d = 0.245, close to q. For the Relative Ball Density Algorithm,
we use a relative ratio of β = 2. After 1000 trials, the overall probability
of error is determined by the average of the error probabilities of both the
random sickness and epidemic cases. Other problem parameters are stated in
each section below.
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7.4.1 Algorithm Comparison
In this paper, we present two algorithms to distinguish random sick-
nesses from epidemics: the Ball Density Algorithm with fixed density and
the relative density of that algorithm. For this section, we denote these the
‘Density’ and ‘Rel. Density’ algorithms respectively. Though we show both
of these algorithms succeed over similar ranges of infection sizes, we have not
directly compared these algorithms analytically. To compare them, we have
simulated both on a grid graph, with weights in {1, 10}. In addition, there are
other algorithms to consider. Our algorithms use weighted balls, but it is also
possible to use balls where the distance is measured in hop counts. We denote
this variation of the Relative Ball Density Algorithm as ‘Rel. Density with
Hops.’ Another possible algorithm is the Ball Algorithm as presented in [46].
In this algorithm, the infection is labeled an epidemic if all the infected nodes
can be contained within a ball of a specified radius. Note that this algorithm
is (nearly) equivalent to the Relative Ball Density Algorithm with infinite rel-
ative factor β. This algorithm is denoted ‘Ball’, and the version where hop
counts are used for the distance is denoted ‘Ball with Hops.’
The simulation results are presented in Figure 7.3 (the ‘Ball with Hops’
algorithm is omitted for clarity). There is a clear ordering of the algorithm per-
formance. From best to worst, the algorithms are ‘Rel. Density’, ‘Ball’, ‘Rel.
Density with Hops’, ‘Ball with Hops’ and finally ‘Density.’ For example, when
around 89% of network is infected, the error probabilities are approximately
1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% respectively. Then we see that on this graph, the
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Figure 7.3: This figure shows the overall error probability for a grid graph
(n = 4900) with the weights on horizontal edges of 1, and on vertical edges of
10 over a range of infections sizes for different algorithms.
Relative Ball Density Algorithm performs better than the other algorithms,
including the Ball Algorithm from prior work. We also see that including the
effects of the weights in the graph is necessary for optimal performance. The
regular Ball Density Algorithm lags behind, partially due to the inability to
adapt as well to larger infection sizes, enabling a random sickness to more
easily exceed the specified density threshold.
7.4.2 Weights
As the difference in edge weights increases, the more skewed the infec-
tion becomes towards the larger edge weights. To examine how tolerant our
algorithm is towards different edge weights, we simulated the Relative Ball
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Figure 7.4: This figure illustrates the overall error probability for the Relative
Ball Density Algorithm on a grid of size n = 4900. The edge weights on the
horizontal edges are 1, and the weights on the vertical edges are given in the
legend.
Density Algorithm on a grid, fixing the weight of the horizontal edges at 1 and
varying the weights of the other edges. The probability of error is shown in
Figure 7.4. As the figure shows, though the error probability increases slightly
as the weights increase, the performance of the algorithm is very similar regard-
less of edge weight distribution on this graph. Then we conclude the Relative
Ball Density Algorithm appropriately adapts to the weight distribution in this
case.
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7.4.3 Unknown Edges
One key feature of our algorithm is that it is robust against unknown
edges. We simulated the Relative Ball Density Algorithm for various numbers
of missing edges to confirm this analytic result. The simulations use a grid
graph with edge weights 1 and 10, but add a variable number of long distance
edges between nodes chosen uniformly at random from the grid, each with
weight 1. These edges are unknown to the algorithm, causing an epidemic to
appear as multiple clusters. The probability of error for different numbers of
these missing edges is shown in Figure 7.5. Note that due to this construction,
the epidemic also spreads somewhat faster the more missing edges there are.
As the figure shows, though the error probability increases significantly at
smaller infection sizes compared to the case without missing edges, it is still low
until a majority of the network is infected. In addition, the error probability
increases very slowly as the number of missing edges increases.
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Figure 7.5: This figure presents the overall error probability when using the
Relative Ball Density Algorithm on a grid graph with n = 4900 with horizontal
and vertical edge weights of 1 and 10 and additional unknown random edges
of weight 1, for various numbers of missing edges.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we have considered the problem of distinguishing between
two infection processes when only limited and unreliable information is avail-
able. The fundamental case of this problem is when an infection appearing
among the population may represent just a random sickness, or an epidemic
that must be identified. Quickly determining when an epidemic occurs is
frequently essential is rapidly understanding, containing, and curing it. We
present two algorithms to solve this problem, the Threshold Ball Algorithm
and the Threshold Tree Algorithm, both of which use the idea of clustering of
the infected nodes to determine if an epidemic is present. We show that both
of these algorithms achieve asymptotically vanishing error probabilities over a
large range of infection sizes on three standard graph topologies, grids, trees,
and Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs. In fact, for grids, our maximum achieveable infection
size is order-wise optimal. From our analytical and simulation results, we con-
clude the Threshold Ball Algorithm has superior or nearly equal performance
to the Threshold Tree Algorithm, and is more efficient to implement.
We also consider the case when we must distinguish between two epi-
demics with differing network structure. To solve this problem, we develop
141
two conditions on the graphs. First, it must satisfy a speed constraint, stat-
ing roughly that the epidemic cannot travel faster than a constant speed on
that graph. Second, the graph must be sufficiently spread out so that a set
of random nodes isn’t clustered on the graph. When those conditions holds,
we show that the Relative Ball Algorithm can determine which epidemic is
the causative process with high probability. These two conditions, the speed
and spread conditions, ensure that the epidemic is well behaved and we apply
related conditions for the rest our results.
In order to make our algorithm more robust, we develop the Quantile
Ball Algorithm and the Multiple Ball Algorithm. This modification is sufficient
to handle the case when there are false positives. In fact, we show that we can
handle the case when an arbitrarily large fraction of the reporting nodes are
false positives if they are located randomly, and up to the maximum possible
fraction of false positives if they are placed adversarially. The Multiple Ball
Algorithm is also sufficiently robust to handle unknown edges in the epidemic’s
graph, including an arbitrarily large number of short edges. We also show that
in the case of two possible mixed infections, where the random sickness and
epidemic occur simultaneously, this algorithm can determine which whether
the infection occured due to the more infectious process provided the processes
are sufficiently distinct.
Finally, we develop a new algorithm for weighted graphs termed the Ball
Density Algorithm. We demonstrate that this algorithm is able to distinguish
between a random sickness and an epidemic under these more challenging
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circumstances. In addition, this algorithm is shown to be robust to both false
positives as well as unknown edges of the graph. We find empirically that this
algorithm slightly outperforms the Threshold Ball Algorithm.
8.1 Future Work
Though we have considered many variations of the problem of distin-
guishing infection processes, as always there are still many question left unan-
swered. Throughout this work, we only consider epidemics based on the SI
infection model, where once nodes become sick, they never recover. However,
in many cases, the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model would be more
appropriate, especially in the case of diseases. In this model, where nodes
recover from their infection, the expected ‘shape’ of the infected region is not
simply a cluster of nodes, but rather contains nodes only at the edges of a ball,
and appears closer to a torus. Due to the reduction in the number of reporting
nodes (since less nodes are infected at a given time), our current algorithms
may have poor performance. An improved algorithm designed for this case
would be valuable in many settings.
Though we have shown that in the majority of cases, our algorithms
can determine the causative infection process for maximum infection times
that are order-wise optimal, this does not mean they are order-wise optimal
in infection size. For graphs in which the infection spreads rapidly such as
tree-like graphs, these algorithms only succeed when up to nβ nodes are in-
fected for some constant β (depending on the graph, algorithm, and other
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parameters). This raises the question, how large can the infection be such
that it is still possible to distinguish a random sickness from an epidemic for
these graph topologies? Developing a converse result determining the neces-
sary conditions for our algorithm to succeed would help answer this question.
In addition, it would be useful to know exactly how the performance of our
algorithm compares to the theoretical optimal algorithm. Along these lines,
work could focus on developing alternative algorithms that may have superior
performance, perhaps by considering a more restrictive class of graphs.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2 Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3.3
Proof of Theorem 2.3.3(a). To prove this theorem, we prove the following
more general statement. Let m be the threshold for the Ball Algorithm and
suppose (2m/d+ 1) < n1/d. If for some  > 0,
t <
m
dµ(1 + )
,
the Type II error probability decreases to 0 as t, m, and n increase. In addition,
the Type I error probability also decreases to 0 in the limit if
tdq
(
n1/d − 2m/d− 1
n1/d
)
= ω(log n).
We begin with the Type II error probability, which we denote by EII :
the probability we mistake an epidemic for a random sickness. As long as m
is chosen as in the statement of the theorem, we are guaranteed that if the
sickness is in fact from an epidemic, then using the above lemma, the spread
of the infection is limited to the subgrid [−m/d,m/d]d with high probability,
where the origin is set to be the original infected node. Consequently, all nodes
must be within m steps of the origin since the grid is d-dimensional. That is,
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we have
EII < 1− P{B(t) ⊂ [−m/d,m/d]d}
< C1t
2de−C2t
−1/2(m/(dµ)−t),
from Lemma 2.3.1, where we use x = min (t−1/2(m/(dµ)− t), t1/2). Therefore,
given  > 0, t < m
dµ(1+)
, indeed the error goes to 0 as t and n increase.
Next, we consider Type I error, EI : the probability we mistake a ran-
dom sickness for an infection process. This happens if all the reporting sick
nodes happen to fall inside the ball of radius m/d. Recall the expected size of
the random sickness is the same as that of the epidemic. We can get a lower
bound on this number for the infection process (and hence for the random
sickness process) this time using the inner bound on B0. For the infection pro-
cess, the second part of Lemma 2.3.1 asserts that the infected region contains
all nodes within the l1-ball of radius w = (1−C3t−1/(2d+4)(log t)1/(d+2))µt with
probability at least 1− P1, where
P1 = C4t
d exp (−C5t(d+1)/(2d+4)(log t)1/(d+2)).
Therefore at least 2 bw/dcd nodes will be sick with that probability, and hence
there will be on average, at least 2q bw/dcd sick nodes reporting. What is the
probability that the random sickness model with (at least) this many sick nodes
will have all reporting nodes inside the sub grid [−m/d,m/d]d? There are
L = (2m/d+ 1)d nodes in that region. Evidently, any given sick node satisfies
that property with probability L/n, so they all satisfy it with probability at
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most (L/n)2q(w/d)
d
. Note that any dependence between sick nodes only reduces
the probability. After this, we use a union bound to find that the probability
no such region contains all sick nodes is at most P2 = n(L/n)
2q(w/d)d .
Putting it all together, we have,
EI < 1− (1− P1)(1− P2) < P1 + P2
< C4t
d exp
(−C5t(d+1)/(2d+4)(log t)1/(d+2))
+ n
((
2m/d+ 1
n1/d
)d)2q(w/d)d
.
and
2(w/d)d ≥ 2d−dµdtd(1− dC3t−1/(2d+4)(log t)1/(d+2)).
Note that P2 dominates as n increases. We want to find the regime
when this probability tends to 0. That is, we want
n exp(2d−dµdtdqd ln
(
1− n
1/d − 2m/d− 1
n1/d
)
(1− dC3t−1/(2d+4)(log t)1/(d+2)))→ 0.
Using a Taylor expansion and some simplification, we find a sufficient
condition for this is that
tdq
(
n1/d − 2m/d− 1
n1/d
)
= ω(log n).
This completes the proof of the general statement. In addition, the Type I
error can be shown to dominate in the range of interest. Theorem 2.3.3(a)
follows immediately using the threshold provided.
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Proof of Theorem 2.3.3(b). Let Xrep be the number of reporting sick nodes,
and let X¯ = Xrep/q (that is, X¯ is basically the expected number of sick nodes
based on the number reporting). Recall S is the complete set of sick nodes.
From the Lemma 2.3.2, we have
P (X¯ log log n < |S|)→ 0
Let µ be the asymptotic rate at which an infection travels as before, and let
 > 0. From the proof of Theorem 2.3.3(a), at time t, we know for δ > 0
P (|S| < (2(1− )µt/d)d)→ 0
Hence t < (X¯ log logn)
1/d
2(1−)µ/d with high probability. Naturally increasing t only
increases the infection size, so it is only necessary to consider the maximum
likely t. In particular, if the threshold m = 1.1dµtmax =
1.1d2X¯ log logn)1/d
2(1−) , then
from Theorem 2.3.3(a), the adaptive thresholding will work with Type I error
probability approaching 1. In addition, if X¯ is ω(log n), the Type II error
probability will decay to 0 as well from the same theorem.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3.4
Proof of Theorem 2.3.4(a). First consider the Type II error probability. Using
Lemma 2.3.1 like in Theorem 2.3.3, the epidemic is contained in a ball of
radius 1.5µt with high probability and hence the size of the epidemic is less
than (3µt)d = m. Since the nodes in the epidemic are connected, the reporting
nodes can clearly be connected by a Steiner tree with size less than that of the
epidemic. Therefore, the Type II error probability decays to 0.
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Now consider Type I errors, so assume the infection is caused by a ran-
dom sickness. With Lemma 2.3.1, we find that the ball of radius 0.5µt/d is
contained in the epidemic, and therefore at least
(
µt
2d
)d
nodes are infected.
Hence, E[|S|] > (2d/3)dm. Assume by hypothesis that E[|S|] < n/(8 ×
(3/d)d log logn/q)d. Divide the grid into blocks of size L = n log logn
qE[|S|] (that is,
the regions should be grid sections of side length L1/d). Note that the expected
number of reporting nodes in each block is log log n. It is easy to see that at
least half of the blocks contain a reporting node, for example with a Chernoff
bound. Consider the shortest path (duplicate edges allowed) connecting all
the reporting nodes. This is no more than twice the length of the Steiner tree
since a path can traverse a tree by traveling along each edge twice.
For each 2× 2× · · · × 2 region, color each block a different color, and
each such region in the same pattern. Note that there are 2d colors used.
Consider the sequence of colors of the blocks the path travels through. Since
blocks of the same color are separated by a distance of L1/d, whenever a color
is repeated, the path must travel at least that distance. Because there are
only 2d colors and at least n/(2L) blocks, there are at least n/(2d+1L)−1 such
repetitions (subtracting the first instance of the colors). Therefore, the path
has length at least
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( n
2d+1L
− 1
)
L1/d =
(
qE[|S|]
2d+1 log log n
− 1
)(
n log log n
qE[|S|)]
)1/d
>
qE[|S|]
2d+2 log log n
(
n log log n
qE[|S|]
)1/d
>
n1/d(qE[|S|])1−1/d
2d+2 log log n
>
n1/dq1−1/dddm
4(3d) log log nE[|S|]1/d
> 2q−1/dm > 2m
where the last line uses our hypothesis on maximum number of infected nodes.
Hence, the Steiner tree has size at least m and the Type I error probability
approached 0.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.4(b). By a Chernoff bound, we see that m is larger than
the number of infected nodes with high probability. Since the Steiner tree is
smaller than the number of infected nodes, the Type II error probability clearly
decays to 0. Turning to the Type I error rate, we can apply the same approach
as for the non-adaptive case. In this case, set L = n log logn
Xrep
. Applying the same
reasoning as before, the length of the Steiner tree connecting random nodes is
at least
Xrep
2d+3 log log n
(
n log log n
Xrep
)1/d
>
n1/dX
1−1/d
rep
2d+3 log log n
=
n1/dqm
3× 2d+3X1/drep (log log n)2
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Therefore, we are done if 3 × 2d+3(log log n)2X1/drep < qn1/d, that is, if Xrep <
qdn/(3 × 2d+3(log log n)2)d. From standard Chernoff bounds, we see Xrep <
qE[|S|] log log n ≤ E[|S|] log log n with high probability. From our hypothe-
sis, using the appropriate constant C1, E[|S|] < n/(3 × 2d+3)d(log log n/q)3d.
Therefore, Xrep <
q3dn
(3×2d+3)d(log logn)3d−1 < q
dn/(3 × 2d+3(log log n)2)d as de-
sired.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2.3.5
Proof of Theorem 2.3.5(a). To prove this theorem, we prove the following
more general statement:
For some constant β < 1, if qE[|S|] = ω(1) and E[|S|] < nβ, then the
Type I error probability tends to 0. Next, there exists a constant b such that if
b0 > b and the threshold m > b0t for all n, then the Type II error probability
converges to 0 asymptotically, as the tree size scales.
The Type II error bound follows from the fact that the epidemic speed
is no more than a constant b [7].
The Type I error result follows simply as well. Given the branching
ratio, c, there are c
m+1−1
c−1 nodes within a distance m from the root. The
probability of a Type I error is (approximately) ( c
m
n
)|Srep| – the probability
that the randomly sick nodes are closer than the threshold m to the root.
Then if cm is o(n), it is sufficient that the probability that |Srep| = 0 goes to 0.
This occurs if the expected number of reporting sick nodes is ω(1). That is, we
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need qE[|S|] = Θ(qe(c−1)t) = ω(1), calculating E[|S|] with a simple differential
equation (shown at the end of this proof). Alternatively, if cm = αn for some
constant α < 1, then we require |Srep| to increase with n with probability 1.
The same condition as before is sufficient for this to be true. This completes
the Type I result.
Using both these results, there is a choice of m such that both error
types become rare as long as cb0t < αn, so ct < (αn)1/b0 . The theorem follows
using a particular threshold.
Now we conclude by showing how we can calculate E[|S|] with the
following differential equation. Let t′ be a variable infection time. Let X(t′)
be the number of infected nodes and Y (t′) be the number of ‘border’ nodes,
uninfected nodes adjacent to an infected node. When a new node becomes
infected, Y (t′) increases by c − 1. Because of this, and since border nodes
become infected at rate 1, Y (t′) = (c − 1)X(t′) + 1 and dE[Y (t′)]/dt = (c −
1)E[Y (t′)]. Solving this equation gives E[Y (t′)] = ce(c−1)t
′
and E[X(t′)] =
c/(c − 1)e(c−1)t′ − 1/(c − 1) > e(c−1)t′ . Therefore, we find E[|S|] ≈ c/(c −
1)e(c−1)t.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.5(b). First, note that E[|S|] scales at least as e(c−1)t (un-
til the infection reaches the leaves of the graph). In fact, for any fixed  > 0,
|S| > e(c−1)t/(1+) with probability approaching 1 (for example, see [25]). Now
we can proceed as in the proof of Theorem 2.3.3(a).
As before, let Xrep be the number of reporting sick nodes and X¯ =
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Xrep/q so X¯ log log n < |S| with high probability. Then we conclude tmax =
1/(c − 1) log(Xrep/q(log log n)2). Hence, by setting b2 = b/(c − 1), we see the
Type II error probability converges to 0 by Theorem 2.3.5(a). Using the same
theorem, we see the Type I error will also go to 0.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2.3.6
Proof of Theorem 2.3.6(a). We prove the following generalization of the theo-
rem: The Type I error probability converges to 0 for any choice of the threshold
m = o(qE[|S|] log n) with qE[|S|] = O(nα) for some α < 1. In addition, the
Type II error probability converges to 0 if m = ω(E[|S|]).
To prove the Type II error result (mistaking an infection for a random
sickness), note that the size of the infection is E[|S|] ≤ e(c−1)t. Since the Steiner
tree containing the reporting nodes can be no larger than the infection itself,
the Type II error converges to 0 as long as we use a threshold m = ω(E[|S|])
from Markov’s inequality.
Next, we evaluate the Type I error probability (mistaking a random
sickness for an infection). This requires estimating the size of the Steiner
tree containing the reporting sick nodes. Suppose there is an α < 1 such
that E[Srep] = O(n
α). Since the number of sick nodes increases with n, the
probability that there are sick nodes on at least two subtrees of the root node
goes to 1, hence the root of the tree is in the Steiner tree connecting the
randomly sick nodes with high probability. Given this, we see that a node
is in the Steiner tree if and only if it is infected or a node below it in the
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tree is infected. Let N = |Srep|. Since E[|Srep|] is ω(1), N is ω(1) with high
probability. Choose the first level in the tree that has at least N/c nodes. Then
there are between N/c and N subtrees below that level. It is straightforward
to show that each sick node in the tree has at least a 1/2 probability of being a
leaf node since c ≥ 2. Since at least N nodes are sick, at least N/4 of the leaf
nodes are sick and distributed independently among the at most N subtrees.
Therefore, the total number of subtrees with sick nodes at the bottom is at
least N/(8c). In addition, each leaf node in a separate subtree requires a path
at least up to the aforementioned level in the Steiner tree. This gives us the
following high probability bound on the Steiner tree size.
Steiner Tree Size >
N
8c
(logc n− logcN)
> N
(1− α) logc n
8c
= |Srep| (1− α) logc n
8c
.
For any w = o(E[|Srep|]), we know that |Srep| > w with probability approach-
ing 1. Also, if E[|Srep|] = O(nα), then Sr = O(nα) with high probability.
Therefore, if m = o(qw logc n), which is equivalent to m = o(E[|Srep|] log n),
the Type I error probability tends to 0.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.6(b). Let Xrep be the number of reporting sick nodes,
X¯ = Xrep/q. Then X¯ log log n upper bounds |S| with high probability. Like be-
fore, |S| log log n > E[|S|] with probability approached 1. Then from Theorem
2.3.6(a), we see that both probability of errors will decrease to 0 asymptoti-
cally.
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 2.3.7
Proof of Theorem 2.3.7(a). The proof follows similar lines as in the previous
section, so we omit most details. In particular, we show the following: Using
a threshold m < logn
3 log c
and qE[|S|] = ω(1), the probability of a Type I error is
at most o(n−1). In addition, the probability of a Type II error converges to 0
as long as m > bt for a constant b specified in the proof.
We bound the probability of a Type II error again using the notion
of the fastest sustainable transit rate from first-passage percolation [7]. As
in Theorem 2.3.5, the constant b comes from the calculation of the infection
spreading rate, and the results follow similarly.
To control the probability of a Type I error, we have to bound the
probability that all randomly sick nodes are within a ball of radius m on the
graph. A sufficient condition for this is that all nodes are within distance 2m
from a given sick node, or there are 0 nodes sick. The latter probability is
simply (1− q)n which decays exponentially. Also, with probability 1− o(n−1),
the number of nodes within a distance 2m from a given sick node is no more
than 16m3c2m log n [11]. Then the error probability in this case is at most(
1− 16m3c2m logn
n
)n
. Then this decays exponentially as long as c2m = o(n),
which occurs when m < logn
3 log c
. Therefore, it is sufficient to show m < logn
3 log c
.
Since the infection size is o(n), we use a branching process approximation to
find that for some λ, E[|S|]→ eλt [18]. Define β2 = λ/(3×1.12b log c). Assume
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E[|S|] < nβ2 as hypothesized. Then asymptotically with high probability,
λt < 1.1β2 log n.
With some computation, m = 1.1bt < log n/(3 log c). Hence, the Type I error
probability also decays to 0.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.7(b). As shown in [18], E[|S|] scales asymptotically as
eλt for some constant λ. In particular, for abitrary constant  > 0, E[|S|] >
eλt/(1+) with probability approaching 1. Then let Xrep be the number of
reporting sick nodes, and X¯ = Xrep/q, so X¯ log log n will upper bound |S| with
high probability. From this, we conclude tmax = 1/λ log(Xrep/q(log log n)
2).
Then by Theorem 2.3.5(a), with b2 = b/λ, we see that the Type II error
probability converges to 0. From the same theorem, the Type I error will go
to 0 as well.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 2.3.8
Proof of Theorem 2.3.8(a). We show the following more general statement:
The Type II error probability decays to 0 if the threshold is chosen as m =
ω(E[|S|]) and E[|S|] = o(n). The Type I error probability goes to 0 when m <
kqE[|S|] for some constant k = o(log(n/(qE[|S|])2)) and qE[|S|] = o(√n).
First, if the sickness is from an infection, the smallest tree connecting
the reporting sick nodes must have size no more than the actual number of
sick nodes. Hence, to bound the Type II error, it is sufficient to bound the
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probability the number of infected nodes is over a certain size. This probability
decreases to 0 as long as m is ω(E[|S|]) when E[|S|] = o(n). To see this, recall
that in this regime, the graph looks locally tree-like. Consequently, we can
bound the maximum number of infected nodes using bounds on the distance
an infection can travel (e.g., see [7]). Again, Markov’s inequality provides the
exact error bound in the theorem statement.
To control Type I error probability, that a random sickness is mistaken
for an infection, we must lower bound the size of the Steiner tree of a random
sickness. For v ∈ Srep, let dv denote the distance from that node to the nearest
other sick node. First we show that
∑
v∈Srep dv ≤ 2SizeTree(G,Srep). Note that
the bound is attained for some graphs, such as a star graph with the central
node uninfected.
Consider the Steiner tree subgraph, and duplicate all edges on it. Since
the degree of each node in the subgraph is even, there is a cycle that connects
all these nodes. Naturally, the length of this cycle, which is twice the size of
the Steiner tree, is larger than the length of the smallest cycle connecting all
sick nodes. In addition, the length of this cycle is at least
∑
v∈Srep dv, since
the distance from one sick node to the next sick node in the cycle is clearly no
smaller than the distance from that sick node to the closest sick node. This
establishes that
∑
v∈Srep dv ≤ 2SizeTree(G,Srep).
Now we simply need to bound dv. To do this, we need an understanding
of the neighborhood sizes in a G(n, p) graph. But as the size of the graph
scales, this is also straightforward to do: recalling that the probability of an
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edge is c/n and hence the expected degree of each node is (asymptotically) c,
then for typical nodes and arbitrary constant  > 0, there are no more than
((1 + )c)d nodes within distance d provided that d = ω(log log n), using a
branching process approximation.
Let Xrep be the number of reporting sick nodes. Now assume Xrep =
o(
√
n). Let  > 0 and l = n/X2rep. Let k = o(log(n/X
2
rep)). Using the above
distance distribution calculation, we find that each sick node v, there are less
than l nodes within distance k. As the sick nodes are randomly selected, the
probability that none of these are within a distance k from v is bounded by
(1 − Xrep/n)l → e−/Xrep → 1 − /Xrep. Thus the distance to the closest
sick node to v is at least k, i.e., dv > k, with high probability, and using
a simple union bound, the same is true, simultaneously, for all sick nodes.
Hence the Steiner tree joining the set of reporting sick nodes is of size at least
SizeTree(G,Srep) ≥ (1/2)
∑
dv = (1/2)kqE[|S|], with probability decaying to
zero. Therefore, the Type I error probability tends to 0 as long as the threshold
satisfies m < kqE[|S|]/2, for k = o(log(n/(qE[|S|])2)). Using this result, we
find that the Tree Algorithm can succeed so long as q log(n/(qE[|S|])2) = ω(1).
This is a complex condition, though the conditions given in the theorem are
sufficient for it to be true.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.8(b). As before, let Xrep be the number of reporting sick
nodes, X¯ = Xrep/q. Then X¯ log log n upper bounds |S| with high probability.
As in Theorem 2.3.8(a), |S| log log n > E[|S|] with probability approaching
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1. Then from Theorem 2.3.8(a), we see that both probability of errors will
decrease to 0 asymptotically.
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Appendix B
Chapter 5 Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 5.3.1
Proof. First we show that no infection (from a single seed) spreads farther
than a distance C3, so each infection contains at most a constant d¯
C3+1 nodes
(where, recall, d¯ is a bound on the maximum degree of the graph). Consider
an arbitrary seed a and all paths of length C3 + 1 beginning at a. There are
at most d¯C3+1 such paths. An infection from a must spread over one such
path in time t0 to spread farther than distance C3. Since the traversal time
of an edge has distribution Exp(η0), the probability the infection can spread
over the edge in time t0 is 1 − e−η0t0 < η0t0. Then using a union bound, the
probability that the infection spreads more than a distance C3 is less than
(d¯η0t0)
C3+1. Let 2 satisfy 0 < 2 < 1. By hypothesis, the expected number of
seeds is γ0t0 = ω(log n) (as q ≤ 1), so since the number of seeds is binomially
distributed, from standard concentration results, the number of seeds is at
most 1 + (1 + )γ0t0 with probability tending to 1. Let P be the probability
the infection spreads farther than distance C3. Then from a final union bound,
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P < (1 + (1 + )γ0t0) (d¯η0t0)
C3+1
= o
(
2γ0t0d¯
C3+1(γ0t0)
−1) (B.1)
= o(2d¯C3+1).
Eq. (B.1) follows from our hypothesis η0t0 = o
(
(γ0t0)
−1/(1+C3)). Therefore,
P → 0 so the infection travels no more than a distance C3 with probability
tending to 1.
Now we need to show no collection of β ball of radius m contains over
an α fraction of the reporting nodes. This is sufficient even for the Scaling
Multiple Ball Algorithm since the m is an upper bound on the radius of each
ball. We first consider all infected nodes. Let  > 0 be a constant as specified
in the theorem statement. For convenience, let C4 = d¯
C3+1, the maximum
number of nodes in a ball of radius C3. Consider an arbitrary node a, and
let Binner = Ball(a,m), Bouter = Ball(a,m + C3). Then from the previous
result, any seed that has an infection that spreads to a node in Binner must
be inside Bouter (since it can only travel a distance C3). By the hypothesis
that m + C3 < b
(
αn
C4β(1+)
)
, |Bouter| < αnC4β(1+) . Therefore, β balls contain
less than αn
C4(1+)
nodes. Let u be the number of seeds, so u = ω(log n), again
by hypothesis. Then from Lemma 4.2.2, the number of seeds within Bouter is
less than αu
C4(1+/2)
with probability greater than 1− 1/n2. Each of these seeds
infects less than C4 nodes, so the total number of infected nodes within Binner
(which must all be from seeds in Bouter) is less than
αu
1+/2
. Hence, this ball
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contains less than a α
1+/2
fraction of the infected nodes.
Finally, we need to show the reporting process does not significantly
impact the fraction of infected nodes seen in the balls. We consider an equiv-
alent method of choosing the reporting nodes: first the number of reporting
nodes is chosen (with the appropriate distribution), and then these are dis-
tributed uniformly over the infected nodes. Let Xrep be the number of report-
ing nodes |Srep|. Then we need to find the probability that αXrep reporting
nodes are within Binner. As we just showed, the probability that any par-
ticular reporting node is within that region is at most α
1+/2
. From a stan-
dard balls-in-bins argument like in Lemma 4.2.2, since αXrep = ω(log n),
P (|Srep ∩Binner| > αXrep) < 1/nβ+1. That is, the probability that at least
αXrep of the reporting nodes are in that region is at most 1/n
β+1.
Since each collection of balls contains over an α fraction of the reporting
nodes with probability no more than 1/nβ+1, from a union bound, we find the
probability that any of the nβ possible set of balls exceeds this bound is at most
1/n. In this case, our algorithm correctly labels it ‘RANDOM’. Therefore, the
Type I error probability decays to 0 as desired.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5.3.2
Proof. First we consider the Multiple Ball Algorithm, we show an upper bound
on the number of seeds (recall seeds are the nodes randomly infected). The
number of seeds is equal to one (the initially infected node) plus a Binomial
random variable with mean γ1t1. Let U be the set of seeds. Since
β
α
=
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ω(1 + γ1t1), from the distribution,
β
α
> |U | with probability scaling to 1.
Define the function R(a) for seed a as the radius of the epidemic that
began at a. Formally, let ω be a realization of the epidemic process, with ωe
defined as the time it takes for the epidemic to spread across edge e and tω(a)
as the time from when the seed a became infected to the end of the infection
(time t1). Then for any node v, let t˜ω(a, v) be the distance from a to v on G
with edge weights equal to ωe, which is the time it would take the epidemic to
spread from a to v. Finally, R(a)
4
= max{distG(a, v) : t˜ω(a, v) ≤ tω(a)}.
From the speed definition, there exists a constant λ such that for each
seed a,
P (R(a) > sη1t1) < e
−λη1t1 .
Now we apply a union bound to see that,
P (∃a ∈ U : R(a) > sη1t1) < β
α
e−λη1t1
< eλη1t1/2e−λη1t1 (B.2)
= e−λη1t1/2 → 0,
where Equation B.2 follows from the fact that log(β/α) = o(η1t1). Therefore,
each seed spreads no farther than a distance m with probability tending to 1.
We now show that our algorithm returns ‘EPIDEMIC’ in this case.
Cover the seed with the largest (reporting) infection using a ball of radius m,
which we showed covers the entire infection for that seed. If β > 1, we cover
the seed with the second largest infection with the next ball, and so on. From
164
our previous result, each such ball covers the infection from the seed entirely.
Since there are at most β/α seeds total, β of which are covered, the fraction of
reporting infected nodes covered is at least β/β
α
= α. Therefore, an α fraction
of the reporting infected nodes has been covered a ball of radius m, so the
Multiple Ball Algorithm returns ‘EPIDEMIC’ as desired.
Now we prove the same result for the Scaling Multiple Ball Algorithm.
Divide up the total infection time t1 into β evenly sized sections. Each section
has duration t1/β, and therefore, since
1
α
= ω(1+γ1t1/β), the number of seeds
in any region is less than 1
α
from a union bound and accounting for the initial
infected node. Now consider the ith region, starting at time (β−i)t1/β, and let
Ui be the set of all seeds that became infected during that time range. Then
each seed a ∈ Ui has an infection duration less than it1/β. From the speed
condition, in the same way as before, for each seed a ∈ Ui,
P (R(a) > sη1it1/β) < e
−iλη1t1/β
≤ e−λη1t1/β.
From a union bound like before,
P (∃i, a ∈ Ui : R(a) > sη1it1/β) < β
α
e−λt1/β
< eλη1t1/(2β)e−λη1t1/β
= e−λη1t1/(2β) → 0.
Then with probability tending to 1, for each i and seed a ∈ Ui, the
infection from a can be contained in the ith ball of the Scaling Multiple Ball
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Algorithm, ordering from smallest to largest. Now, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ β, cover
the largest infection (in terms of reporting nodes) from seeds in Ui with the
ball of radius sη1t1i/β. Therefore, since each region has at most
1
α
nodes, for
each region, at least α fraction of the reporting nodes from infections starting
during that time frame are contained in a ball. Thus, the Scaling Multiple
Ball Algorithm can contain at least an α fraction of the reporting nodes in the
collection of balls, and hence returns ‘EPIDEMIC’.
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